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Part 2
Protest, contentious collective
action and democratization

Inés M. Pousadela*
Participation vs. Representation?
The Experience of the Neighborhood 
Assemblies of Buenos Aires, 00-003
Introduction
This work is based on a series of in-depth interviews conducted with present and 
former participants of the movement of political protest formed by the “popular” 
or “neighborhood” assemblies founded in buenos aires around the end of 2001 
and the beginning of 2002. Discourses produced in exceptional times tend to be 
profoundly revealing of ordinary, widely shared notions. Thus, the aim of this 
work consists in analyzing the discourse about political representation and de-
liberation that constituted the axis of the aforementioned experience, which took 
place in the midst of a deep crisis of representation. More specifically, it seeks 
to analyze the discourse of assembly members about the assemblies and their 
practices; about representation, delegation, participation, political parties, repre-
sentative democracy and direct democracy in order to apprehend their underlying 
conceptions of representation, its paradoxes, its potential and its limits.
What kind of space for participation and deliberation were the assemblies? What 
stance did they take towards the institutions of political representation? Did they pres-
ent themselves as a complement, a correction, or an alternative to their deficiencies 
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and failures? What were the reasons for their rapid decline; what remained from them 
in the deep layers of argentine politics? These are some of the questions that we try 
to answer through the analysis of the discourse of present and former participants of 
the assemblies, the appearance and rapid multiplication of which we locate at the in-
tersection of two distinct processes: on the one hand, the slow, generalized and long-
term process of metamorphosis of representation, conducive from “party democracy” 
to “audience democracy”; on the other hand, the crisis of representation, an explosive 
phenomenon, limited in time and space, characterized by the very absence of recog-
nition of the representative bond on the part of the represented.
This analysis is not based on a representative sample of the universe under 
study. The main reason for that is the absence of complete knowledge of that uni-
verse, which is the direct effect of the peculiar nature of the assembly movement. 
We are indeed dealing with a fluid movement of undefined limits, with highly 
fluctuating numbers of participants over time and with a “membership” that can 
only be estimated, at any given moment, within very wide margins of error. The 
available socioeconomic and demographic classifications of its participants are in-
tuitive at best, based on prejudice at worst. secondly, even if it had been possible 
to design a sample fitted to our object, it would have turned out to be too big for 
our modest means, given all the supposedly relevant variables. our aim has thus 
been to compile a reasonable quantity of discourse from present and past mem-
bers of the assemblies in order to analyze it in the context of all the information 
available from both primary and secondary sources. That is why we discarded the 
possibility of a sample and chose instead to look for as much diversity as possible 
among our interviewees; in other words, we opted for variety instead of statistical 
representation. Thirty-seven detailed interviews were held with twenty-one men 
and sixteen women, whose ages ranged from twenty-three to eighty-five (with the 
highest concentration between forty and fifty years old) and who belonged or had 
belonged to a wide variety of assemblies in the city of buenos aires and, sec-
ondarily, in its metropolitan area. our interviewees diverge widely in occupational 
terms: university students, primary school teachers, merchants, artists and artisans, 
liberal professionals, public employees, unemployed and retired people, and even 
one person that defines himself as an “activist” are included. The group is also di-
verse where previous political experience is concerned: it includes people with no 
political experience who confess that they went through a sort of “second birth” as 
they got involved in a political mobilization for the first time in their lives; others 
that claim to always have had “political interests” but whose previous experience 
was limited to attending demonstrations, mostly related to human rights issues; oth-
ers that were once “sympathizers” of some political party or were briefly members 
of one, most often left-leaning; others who used to have an intense participation in 
a (probably left-wing) political party or while at the university; others who label 
themselves “lifetime activists” and have indeed been members of different parties 
and organizations, but did not belong to any of them at the time of their entry into 
the assembly movement; and others that were politically active as of December, 
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2001, mostly in left leaning political parties. in contrast with the great majority of 
available research –case studies involving one or, more frequently, two assemblies 
in a comparative perspective–, we analyze the experience that took place in a set of 
assemblies as wide and diverse as possible, so as to achieve a characterization di-
vorced from the peculiarities of any particular assembly and from the constellation 
of circumstances that originated and shaped each of them. some of the assemblies 
mentioned no longer existed, while others were still active when the interviews 
took place. Twenty-two of our interviewees still participated in them at that time, 
whereas fifteen of them had already quit. Some of the latter had abandoned either 
because their assemblies had lost dynamism and were almost extinct, or because 
they had been let down for any reason (different aims, ruptures, attempts at coopta-
tion and inefficacy, among others); others, finally, had stopped participating at the 
very moment when their assemblies disappeared.
The fact that our interviews were conducted in the year 2005 demands an 
additional explanation. The time gap between the facts and their narration pres-
ents both advantages and disadvantages. We have tried to capitalize on the bene-
fits of a retrospective look at already concluded processes without being affected 
by the disadvantages related to the intervention of memory, such as the “distor-
tions” that result from oblivion and from the “contamination” with information 
obtained later in time, as well as from the retrospective adaptation to knowledge 
not available at the time of the events. Where necessary, we have compared the 
information offered by the interviewees with data from other sources. however, 
at the center of our attention are the ideas held by our interviewees about political 
representation and their interpretations of the processes they went through rather 
than the empirical accuracy of their recollections.
in the next few pages we offer a reconstruction of the context of the crisis 
of representation of October-December, 2001, based on journalistic and official 
sources, academic material and testimonies from our interviewees. in the third sec-
tion we deal with the emergence of the assembly movement, while in the last one 
we proceed to analyze the discourse of our assembly members on three big issues 
that are revealing of the existence of various visions of representation as well as of 
the depth of its crisis. We analyze the different interpretations of the battle cry of the 
protest of December, 2001, Que se vayan todos (“everyone must leave”); their vi-
sions of the relationships between their assemblies and representative institutions; 
and, last but not least, their descriptions and interpretations of the deliberation and 
decision-making processes that took place within the assemblies, as well as of the 
eventual emergence within them of leaderships and instances of delegation.
Representation in crisis. From electoral outburst
to street mobilization.
first it was the electoral outburst. it was no coincidence that dissatisfaction be-
came apparent when the center-left Ucr-frepaso alliance failed. not only had 
the alliance government inaugurated in 1999 turned out to be particularly inept 
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and lacking in imagination: it also was, from the prevailing point of view at the 
time, the only remaining chance after a radical government (1983-1989) trun-
cated by hyperinflation and a Peronist one (1989-1999) whose heritage was one 
of poverty, unemployment and corruption.
by the time of the 2001 legislative elections the failure of the alliance was 
apparent on all fronts: not only where it had made little or no promise at all but 
also on issues that were at the core of its identity and the satisfaction of which 
depended mostly on political will rather than economic resources. among them 
was the corruption issue, which had been placed by the alliance at the center of 
its 1999 presidential campaign. less than a year after their electoral triumph a 
scandal had exploded after the denunciation of alleged bribes received by sena-
tors in exchange for the passing of a bill introduced by the government. The lack 
of presidential willingness to investigate the facts then became apparent. as a 
result, the vice-president (also president of the senate) resigned and thus broke 
the governing coalition at the end of 2000. The governmental attitude revealed 
to the public the existence of a “political class” in the strong sense of the word, 
that is, of “a caste that permanently recycles itself”, that involves “the whole 
political spectrum” (male, 57, retailer, asamblea popular de pompeya, with pre-
vious political experience), and that is at the base of a “system” that functions 
“unrelated to its specific function”. Politicians, especially those in the legislative 
branch, were thus perceived as representatives unable to represent since “they 
do not relate to us, to citizens’ opinions, and they do not comply with their ba-
sic purpose that is the common good. They form a closed circle aimed at the 
maintenance and the increase of their own power” (female, 60, psychologist, 
Vecinos indignados de Vicente lópez, without previous political experience). 
more than from the results of the judicial process, the relevance of the bribe 
scandal resulted from its verisimilitude for public opinion. in that sense, it was a 
moment of open visibility in which the gap became apparent between the idea of 
democracy as “government by the people” and its factual reality as “government 
by politicians”. politicians that, in addition, were considered to be “all the same”: 
equally “corrupt”, “thieves” and “criminals”, according to the most frequent epi-
thets. only the opening of a window of opportunity was needed for the crisis to 
overtly explode.
That is what eventually happened when mid-term elections were held in oc-
tober, 2001, barely twenty-four months after those 1999 elections characterized 
by mild optimism as menem’s decade-long government drew to a close. how 
did the protest start? explanations based on the sheer enumeration of damage 
are spectacular but ineffective. numerous explanations indeed function on the 
assumption that an accumulation of “objective data” is sufficient as a cause for 
political and social mobilization. We nevertheless know –at least since Alexis de 
Tocqueville’s explanation for the eruption of revolution in France– that no “ob-
jective” information is enough without the intermediation of the imaginary and 
the construction of subjectivities. The abrupt fall of the national gross product, 
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the effects of successive adjustment policies that reached their peak in July in 
election year and the astronomic figures of unemployment and poverty reveal 
nothing by themselves. According to official data, in October, 2001 the unem-
ployment rate was 18.3%, whereas underemployment reached 16.4%. sixteen 
million of the thirty-six million inhabitants of the country were below the poverty 
line and more than five million had fallen below the line of extreme poverty. 
now, why was the explosion to happen when unemployment hit, say, 20%? Why 
not earlier; why not later?
The key is to be found in the ways in which citizens process bare empirical 
data such as country-risk figures or unemployment and poverty rates. Through-
out 2001 argentina’s country-risk mark had been constantly increasing. for 
some time the government tried to prevent the figure from surpassing the line 
that separated attraction of investment from capital flight. By the time the figure 
surpassed all limits, it had become a piece of basic information that any citizen 
apparently needed to know in order to leave their home every morning, as if 
it were the weather forecast –while only experts had known about its very ex-
istence only a few months earlier. The crisis was then perceived in the feeling 
that macro-level variables had direct and immediate effects on everybody’s daily 
lives. The overwhelming sensation was that the news brought by the newspaper 
had the potential to overturn each individual’s fate, which turned out to be in for-
eign, uncontrollable hands. as for unemployment and poverty data, what was at 
stake was the very self-image of argentines, torn to pieces by the fact that there 
were hungry people in a country with a potential to feed the world. Television 
broadcasted images of starving children in the northern provinces; argentina 
started receiving donation shipments from the same european countries whose 
emigrants had populated its territory a century earlier; web sites started spread-
ing among prosperous europeans the idea of fostering an argentine child so she 
could eat and attend school. it was then that argentines suddenly realized that 
they were not as “european” as they had believed themselves to be: not only did 
argentina belong indeed in latin america, but it was also undergoing conditions 
that its middle class plainly identified with Africa. It was, in sum, the image that 
Argentines had of themselves and their future –which seemed to be suddenly cut 
off– which had changed. The collective state of mind had shifted from the eupho-
ria of the nineties to plain self-denigration. This feeling was soon to have a vivid 
translation in the image of the hundreds who lined up at the doors of the spanish 
and italian consulates to get a passport that was the promise of a fresh start in the 
land of their ancestors. The fact that many people left the country in precarious 
conditions was another translation of the reigning sensation that nowhere could 
things be worse.
several months before the elections, the rejection that would become appar-
ent in the polls –and later on in an extra-electoral and even an extra-institutional 
way– was in the air both in streets and in the virtual space of the web turned into 
a forum for citizen expression and communication. Dissatisfaction with the po-
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litical offer abounded, as it was criticized for displaying the same old faces, the 
very senators suspected of receiving bribes in exchange for the passing of a law, 
the unknown people who occupied their congressional seats thanks to the widely 
criticized “blanket lists” (listas sábana) that nobody seemed to be really willing 
to get rid of; in sum, the same politicians that had long been participating, without 
partisan distinctions, in transactional activities resulting in the detour of large 
public funds and the distortion of their mission as representatives of the people. 
in that context, appeals by individual “common citizens” or by ad hoc citizen 
associations mushroomed to cast blank votes or to void the vote by using hand-
made fake ballots instead of the official ones –so as to “vote” for funny fictional 
characters or for respectable historical figures– or by placing in the envelope crit-
ical or insulting messages for politicians or any kind of object that could be used 
to express anger and dissatisfaction. still others refused to sanction the reigning 
lack of options by abstaining: the so-called “kilometer 501” group, for instance, 
planned to deceive the authorities by organizing collective excursions on election 
day to transport voters somewhere more than five hundred kilometers away from 
their voting places, therefore legally exempting them from their electoral duty.
The results of the election were attuned with this climate of opinion. Those 
who did not vote or cast some form of “negative” vote (void or blank) added up 
to more than 40% of all qualified voters, more than the added votes received by 
the two major political parties. Though it varied enormously from one district to 
another, abstention reached an unprecedented 24.58 % at a national level. Void 
and blank votes added up to 23.99 % of the votes cast for national representa-
tives (13.23% and 10.76%, respectively). Those electoral behaviors –more ac-
centuated within urban sectors and among those with a higher socioeconomic or 
educational level– were not an expression of apathy or lack of interest but they 
had –especially the former– an active and even “activist” character. The ava-
lanche of void votes was indeed a novel occurrence. blank votes had slowly but 
continuously increased since the restoration of democracy in 1983; a similar path 
had been followed by abstention, despite voting being compulsory. Until 2001, 
however, surveys showed that the main reasons for abstention were the lack of 
interest and time to sort out information rather than sheer rejection of politics due 
to its identification with corruption (Ferreira Rubio, 1998). That was still not a 
situation of crisis of representation, but the normal (though certainly precarious 
and volatile) state of affairs in the context of the new format of representation that 
had been established gradually since 1983 (pousadela 2004, 2005). The transition 
from “party democracy” towards “audience democracy” –which we describe, 
following Bernard Manin (1992, 1998), as a “metamorphosis of representation”– 
implies indeed a series of transformations. among them can be mentioned the 
personalization of political leaderships, the transformation of parties into de-ide-
ologized electoral machines, the decline of the importance of party programs, the 
growing impact of the mass media –and of television in particular– as a scene 
where political events are produced, the consequent prevalence of image over the 
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debate of ideas, the decline of captive electorates and the fluctuation of the politi-
cal preferences of voters, whose loyalties can no longer be taken for granted. it 
was this situation of apathetic normality that was shaken by the citizens’ electoral 
behavior in october, 2001.
While electoral results and survey data in the previous twenty years had at 
all times adjusted to what was reasonable to expect in the context of audience 
democracy, the events that took place on october 14th, 2001 and in the following 
months took on a completely different shape. They constituted indeed a quali-
tatively different phenomenon: an authentic crisis of representation. from then 
on, the focus was redirected towards the relationship of representation and the 
mechanisms that seemed to make representatives “disloyal” from the very mo-
ment they became so; towards the “political class” rejected for its homogeneity, 
that turned political competition into a useless formality, as well as for its power-
ful corporate interests; and towards the search for alternatives to the conflictive 
relationship between representatives and represented.
Two months after the electoral cataclysm the extra-electoral outburst oc-
curred. The process sped up since the beginning of December, when it became 
apparent that the national government would be unable to honor the service for 
the national debt due at the end of the year. The refusal by the imf to unblock a 
new loan to make sure that those payments could be made and that the minimal 
expenses of the State apparatus could be covered provoked a huge capital flight. 
on December 3rd a decree was enacted that drastically limited cash withdrawals 
from banks; in no time, this policy came to be popularly known as the finan-
cial “corralito”, named after the play pens that will not allow babies to escape 
from adult surveillance. a month later the parity between the peso and the dollar 
on which the stability of the economy had been built a decade earlier was al-
ready history, and savings trapped in banks had undergone a brutal devaluation. 
Thousands of million dollars, mostly held by big business, had nevertheless fled 
abroad. at the same time, strikes of civil servants continued to spread across the 
provinces demanding unpaid wages, converging with the demonstrations staged 
by the movements of unemployed workers who had already been out in the streets 
for a long time making themselves visible through piquetes (pickets) and cortes 
de rutas (roadblocks). on December 12th the first cacerolazo (pot-banging) took 
place in the city of buenos aires, starring middle-class citizens in protest for the 
freezing of their bank accounts. The next day, there was a general strike sum-
moned by the three union federations (the two CGT –official and dissident– and 
the cTa). in the same week a national consultation also took place organized by 
the Frente Nacional contra la Pobreza (national front against poverty), an alli-
ance of the cTa and some center-left and left wing parties. its results surpassed 
the organizers’ most optimistic predictions, as three million people expressed 
their support for the proposal of a universal unemployment benefit. On the 14th 
riots and looting took place in two important cities, rosario and mendoza, gradu-
ally spreading to other districts and arriving in the Great buenos aires three days 
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later. in the latter, the climate of confusion was additionally fed by the provoca-
tive intervention of the peronist party machine. Two days later, on December 19th, 
the riots and clashes with the police in Great Buenos Aires caused the first deaths, 
some of them at the hands of retailers seeking to defend their businesses, many 
others as a result of police repression. in various places there were strikes and 
demonstrations, mostly by public employees, which targeted not just the federal 
government but also provincial and municipal ones, most of them under peronist 
rule. particularly violent street combats took place in several districts. many of 
our interviewees recall the feeling that the situation had “exploded”, which hap-
pened to make them “responsible” for what came after. The prevalent thought 
was –in the words of a former assembly member from Lanús– that “everything 
was over, we needed to do something” (female, 26, with no previous political ex-
perience). on that same night president De la rúa pronounced a televised speech 
in which he denounced the “enemies of order and of the republic”, threatened 
with repression, declared the state of siege and summoned the opposition –much 
too late– for “national unity”.
pot-banging began in buenos aires as the president was still reading his 
speech, which many of our interviewees describe as “pathetic” and “autistic”. 
once the speech was over, demonstrators began to converge spontaneously, hold-
ing their pots and pans, towards plaza de mayo, in an open and explicit challenge 
to the state of siege that had just been established. This particular element is 
underlined by most people interviewed, who concede comparatively less impor-
tance to the freezing of bank accounts and to the existence of a conspiracy to 
overthrow De la rúa as an explanation for the mobilization.
The state of siege is indeed identified by our assembly members as “the 
legal symbol of military dictatorships” and “a memory of past times”. its im-
plantation “had a decisive weight as a trigger for the people’s response” (male, 
50, left wing activist), itself a result of “so many years of activism by human 
rights organizations [that] have left an indelible mark on the brain, or in some 
place of the collective unconscious” (female, 38, foro social de la ciudad de 
buenos aires, with political and partisan experience). in that sense, the challenge 
to the state of siege signals the “closing of a historical phase that began with the 
dictatorship”. it was precisely that challenge which made it possible to re-signify 
and recover the national symbols that had been captured by the military: thus, for 
example, explains an interviewee that “i don’t like to sing the argentine anthem, 
and i believe that night i sang it, because it was a different context” (male, 49, 
journalist, asamblea de palermo Viejo, exiled during the dictatorship).
in any case, most of our interviewees agree that it was precisely when the 
state of siege was announced that the noise of pots and pans began. a few hours 
later, already in plaza de mayo, the demand that would become the hallmark 
of the political protest, still incomplete, was initially heard: que se vayan (“go 
away”). at one in the morning on December 20th the resignation of the minister 
of economy demanded by demonstrators turned into fact. six hours later it was 
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the president himself who left the Casa Rosada aboard a helicopter after signing 
his own resignation. For the first time in history, a government born out of free 
elections had been overthrown not by a military coup but by popular rejection 
expressed in the streets. it was, according to an assembly member who describes 
the day as “feverish”, “an unprecedented situation, [because] it seemed that the 
people were overthrowing a president” (male, 32, photographer, asamblea Gas-
tón riva, with little prior political experience).
The bulk of the literature devoted to the analysis of the events describes 
them in epic terms, as a situation of rupture after which nothing would remain 
the same. Under the same light they are viewed by many of the protagonists. 
although not all of our interviewees went out on the night of the 19th, those who 
did unanimously describe their nightly outing as a “wonderful” and “extraordi-
nary” moment and the events of those days as the “culmination of a great social 
process”, a “moment of rupture” or “a hinge in argentine history”. however, 
whereas some try to capture their sense by means of the classic vocabulary of 
class struggle or by analogy with other, better-known historical processes, many 
more emphasize the absolute novelty of the phenomenon.
among the many novelties, the participation of people with no prior politi-
cal experience is systematically mentioned by our interviewees, who describe the 
population as previously “asleep” as a result either of the repression that took place 
in the seventies, or of the benefits yielded by economic stability in the nineties. “It 
reminded me of the film Awakenings”, points out a former member of an assembly 
in flores. “[There was] an absolute paralysis, inertia (…) and suddenly people went 
out to the streets… i don’t think they will do that again, not even if their football 
team wins the cup” (female, 38, with political and partisan experience). among 
those who “went out” for the first time was a member-to-be of the Asamblea de 
castro barros y rivadavia that views himself as part of “the social class favored 
by menemismo” (thus, although he “saw that things were not too well”, he did not 
react before “because it didn’t affect me”). “What happened on December, 19th and 
20th”, he says, “was that i lost my innocence” (male, 36, business administrator).
also original was the fact that the openly questioned logic of representation 
was temporarily supplanted by the “logic of expression” (colectivo situaciones 
2002:15). mobilization on December 19th is indeed described as an “outbreak” or 
an “explosion”, and the state of siege is recognized as the window of opportunity 
that allowed for the free channeling of tiredness, anguish, fear or fury, among the 
many feelings repeatedly mentioned. it was all about “going out and protesting 
and making a catharsis. something that seemed very tragic suddenly turned into 
a carnival” (female, 29, sociologist, asamblea de palermo Viejo, self-described 
as “independent”). another member of the same assembly adds that “there were 
thousands and thousands of people in the streets, defying the state of siege, not 
knowing very well why they were there (…) There was a sensation of ‘wanting 
more’, although nobody knew very well of what” (male, 49, journalist, with po-
litical experience in the ‘70s and ’80s).
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along with the mainly expressive character of the demonstration, its spon-
taneous, self-summoned and unexpected nature is also systematically underlined. 
“it was a chain almost without an origin”, writes horacio González, a well-known 
sociologist. “nobody could say ‘i initiated this’, and in the Bar Británico, a few 
days later, people discussed: ‘i saw you and i began’.” (colectivo situaciones 
2002:48). A member of an assembly in Flores reflects in the same way: “I said: 
‘Who was the first to bang?’ As in a football stadium, who starts singing the 
song? There is someone who is the first one. Perhaps one day a saucepan’s lid fell 
and thus it began”. so spontaneous were the cacerolazos that in those days “no-
body knew when the next one would come”, stresses another assembly member 
(male, 49, asamblea de palermo Viejo, with prior political experience).
The act of challenge that was the nocturnal excursion of December 19th was 
also the celebration of a surprise: its protagonists were gained by the feeling that 
they were living through an historical event; the feeling of being dragged by an 
unexpected collective process that, at the same time, turned them into actors. “i 
was surprised, overwhelmed, moved as i passed by the neighborhoods and saw 
people coming out to their balconies; it was a moment of communion”, explains 
a member of the asamblea Gastón riva who says that at that precise moment 
he had the “feeling that i was living a historical moment, that i was making a 
historical moment” (male, 32, with little previous political experience). a former 
member of the asamblea de pedro Goyena y puán frames it the following way:
It	is	very	strange	to	be	conscious	on	the	very	moment	that	you	are	li-
ving	something	historical.	(…)	We	felt	that	finally	something	was	going	
on	(…)	That	effervescence,	that	idea	that	life	had	a	meaning	(…)	There	
was	also	uncertainty.	We	tried	to	be	alert	and	not	miss	anything	(Male,	
4,	with	no	previous	political	experience)
The same individuals who, in their role as an audience, had spent long hours 
following the evolution of the events on television; the same ones that had gath-
ered in front of their screens to watch the last public appearance of the president 
declaring the state of siege and that soon –still as spectators– had moved towards 
windows and balconies so as to listen and watch what was going on outside; those 
individuals became actors at the very moment when, not knowing exactly why 
–or maybe knowing that but not knowing if their own motivations were in agree-
ment with those of the others– they rushed to their kitchens to get a pot, a frying 
pan or bucket to hit, still from their windows. Those individuals became part of 
the multitude when they saw their neighbors –people that, according to many 
interviewees, they had never talked to before– with their pans at their respective 
doors and joined them, first from their own doors, soon on the street corner, later 
at some emblematic intersection or in the neighborhood park, and somewhat later, 
perhaps, on the way to plaza de mayo, or to the president’s residence in olivos, 
or to the home address of the resigned minister of economics. “people went like 
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this, almost individually… not in a collective movement”, remembers a former 
assembly member of palermo Viejo (male, 65, with no previous political experi-
ence). alone, TV sets remained on with nobody to watch them for hours, even 
for the whole night. The clothes worn by demonstrators, the company of young 
children and babies in strollers who now moved in groups along the streets was 
another sign of the unplanned character of the departure. There were no political 
parties, and only the national flag was to be seen. Another member of the same 
assembly recalls that “there were more people than placards, and placards were 
behind people and not the other way round” (male, 48, unemployed and student, 
with brief previous political experience). “people did not shout political slogans, 
it was not the usual stuff”, ratifies another assembly member, also from Palermo 
(male, 49, with long previous political experience).
The people who participated that day –acknowledges a former member of 
the same assembly– were “disorganized people, neighbors who barely recog-
nized each other” (female, 44). interviewees who identify themselves as “com-
mon citizens” accept more naturally the spontaneous character of the events; by 
contrast, those with a greater activist experience tend to express doubts about 
it. They certainly recognize they were surprised by the first cacerolazo; some 
even say they went to bed after listening to the presidential speech or that at the 
moment they were at some holiday toast or somewhere in the company of other 
activists, none of whom knew how to react. “some of us were not sure whether 
we had to go downstairs and outside. The activists were more like puzzled”, re-
members one of them. “We activists arrived after the people… that is, after the 
first people who came out with no previous organization”. But they state that later 
on the same night, activism began to “operate” providing some form of organiza-
tion. others, however, refuse to believe that such a demonstration could even be 
possible without some kind of political direction. says one of our party activists: 
“i have some doubts, as a result of the way i see politics, that mobilizations on the 
19th were just the effect of spontaneity. I find it difficult to convince myself that 
there was nobody with the political vision to summon the mobilization” (male, 
50). Those doubts become apparent in the hesitations of language; a member of 
an assembly of san cristóbal, for example, talks about the arrival of the “col-
umns” of demonstrators at the plaza to rapidly correct herself: “no, it was not 
organized in columns, we just came like this, and people converged”.
During the days of the protest a temporary suspension of previous social 
identities took place (Giarraca, 2003). our interviewees refer to it by means of 
the description of the events as a “celebration” or a “carnival”, a vortex in which 
“you were not aware of time or of where you were” (male, 29, student, asam-
blea de palermo Viejo, with no previous political experience). Thus, under one 
and the same motto a chain of equivalence among extremely diverse demands 
and reclamations was knit. central among them were the repudiation against a 
model of economic growth based on exclusion and the rejection of an inefficient, 
ineffective and corrupt political system. The slogan “que se vayan todos” (“ev-
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erybody must go away”) that was for the first time uttered in those days included 
whichever unanswered complaint was in need of the identification of a culprit.
in contrast to the happy climate of the 19th, on the 20th plaza de mayo turned 
into a battlefield and a stronghold that some people wanted to occupy and others 
wanted to clear. “The spontaneity and the family-thing of the 19th”, says a mem-
ber of the asamblea 20 de Diciembre de flores “changed on the 20th when there 
was already an action by groups minimally politicized, but politicized still. There 
were people on their own, guys in suits throwing floor tiles, inflamed. But the 
presence was very strong of politicized groups, with no party banners” (male, 33, 
party activist). “You could see four or five [acquaintances], the Mothers [of Plaza 
de mayo], their head scarves… but the activism you know, that of my generation 
was not there”, tells an assembly member of parque patricios. “The one that con-
fronted the cops was clearly another activism (…) The left was there, but it was 
outside the mayhem. (…) The left did not confront [the police]. and i saw how 
other people did: the motoqueros, the nonpartisan piquetero organizations (…) 
it was basically a rebellion of the underclass youth. (…) it was a popular rebel-
lion, but a rebellion without a leadership” (male, 54, with activist experience in 
the ‘70s). an “unruly” violence occupied the center-stage. it was an intense vio-
lence whose precedents could not be found in the guerrilla actions of the 70’s but 
“in soccer stadiums and in the rock concerts that took place in neighborhoods” 
(Colectivo Situaciones 2002:63), and also –as is mentioned by several interview-
ees– in the piquetero struggles and in puebladas (popular uprisings) such as those 
of santiago del estero (1993), cutral-có, plaza huincul (1996) and corrientes 
(1999), where the repertoire of collective action that was now re-shaped in plaza 
de Mayo was originally compiled. The final count of the two-day experience in 
December, 2001 included 35 people dead, 439 wounded and 3273 under arrest.
Despite the efforts made by various left wing political parties to lead them, 
those events did not have an author –that is, they were not summoned, started, 
guided, directed or controlled by anyone. “The main party leaders [of the left] 
were like me, drinking mate at home as they heard the noises”, states an in-
terviewee. however, as a result of the activation of the cleavage separating the 
“commoners” and the “political class” and as an effect of the subsequent division 
of the political space into two antagonistic fields, the events did indeed produce 
a subject. One of an unprecedented amplitude and an undefined character, as 
roughly a third of buenos aires’ inhabitants participated in the cacerolazos and/
or in the assemblies that followed.
after the president’s resignation, after the successive resignations of those 
who followed in the chain of succession and after two days of intense negotia-
tions, the legislative assembly (that is, both chambers of congress deliberating 
together in a special session) eventually appointed the peronist governor of san 
luis, adolfo rodríguez saá, as a substitute president with the mandate to rule 
until new elections were held on march, 3rd, 2002. a euphoric rodríguez saá 
was inaugurated on December 23rd and announced to the legislative assembly 
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the suspension of payments for the external debt and the country’s subsequent 
fall into default (thus receiving the shameful applause of his congressional audi-
ence), the promise to create a million new jobs in a month, the maintenance of the 
peso-dollar parity along with the creation of a “national third currency” (there-
fore, a concealed devaluation), the end of the “corralito” that kept savings out 
of the reach of their proprietors, and the immediate initiation of the “productive 
revolution” that had been announced –but not undertaken– by President Menem 
in 1989. Once in his seat, the new president expressed his willingness –contrary 
to his mandate– to remain there until the end of the unfinished De la Rúa’s term, 
that is, December 10th, 2003. popular demonstrations resumed when it was an-
nounced, in open contradiction with the promises made the previous day, that 
the corralito was to be maintained, and when highly criticized former members 
of menem’s government were appointed to important posts. in that context, the 
peronist governors soon undermined the new president, who finally resigned on 
new Year’s eve. in the course of the protest against rodríguez saá the battle 
cry “Que se vayan” was transformed into the well-known, definite one “Que se 
vayan todos” (“everybody must go”). in addition, a precision was added: “Que 
no quede ni uno solo” (“not a single one should stay”). indeed, neither union 
leaders nor judges were spared their share of public disbelief and rejection. What 
this cacerolazo made clear was how weak governments –and public figures in 
general– were once placed under the vigilant reflectors of an unusually alert citi-
zenship that had already successfully de facto revoked their rulers’ mandate and 
was ready to do it again if necessary.
on January 2nd, 2002 the legislative assembly appointed a new president: 
eduardo Duhalde, former governor of the province of buenos aires, powerful 
leader of the peronist party machine in the district and, paradoxically, the same 
presidential candidate defeated in 1999 by fernando De la rúa, whose term he 
was now called to complete. At the time –recalls one of our interviewees– “a 
cacerolazo took place that was not so talked about in the media. it was a holiday, 
so it did not have as much of a repercussion, but i was near the congress when the 
vote was going on and the noise of pots and pans was audible. it was a joke, to ap-
point him who came from the PJ (Partido Justicialista), from that mafia, he who 
had been with menem and who had lost the election against De la rúa” (male, 
29, sociologist, asamblea de palermo Viejo, with no prior political experience).
in the process that led from De la rúa’s resignation to the relative stabi-
lization of a substitute government around April, 2002 five presidents and six 
ministers of economy followed one another. During those months all kinds of 
conflicts took place: strikes and conflicts stemming from poverty, unemployment 
	 	 Indeed,	 the	Legislative	Assembly	 entrusted	Duhalde	with	 the	presidency	until	
the	end	of	00.	Nevertheless,	 in	June,	00,	after	a	police	repression	that	caused	
the	deaths	of	two	young	piqueteros	in	Avellaneda,	Duhalde	felt	compelled	to	trim	his	
mandate	and	called	for	an	early	election	in	April,	00.
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and hunger –pickets, roadblocks, food demands and lootings– converged with 
the protest of the impoverished and attacked middle-class who verified its veto 
power through the cacerolazos and, secondarily, through verbal and sometimes 
physical attacks against politicians –identified as the most prominent people re-
sponsible for the situation. Days were “so intense”; “presidents were replaced 
all the time”, remembers an interviewee. “With each change you went out to the 
plaza; it was necessary to go there and exert pressure because the demand was for 
a constituent assembly” (male, 43, artist and university professor, ex-asamblea 
de pedro Goyena y puán, with no previous political experience).
The assembly movement as a response
to and a catalyst of the crisis
The most novel and longest-lasting product of the events of December 19th and 
20th, 2001 were the “popular” or “neighborhood” assemblies. assemblies were 
the organizational by-product of the spontaneity of the insurrectional days and 
at their origin was the experience of power. several assembly members indeed 
locate the origins of their own participation in that new feeling that “something 
could be done”:
It	was	not	the	seizure	of	power,	nor	the	foundation	of	a	party…	I	knew	
that	 I	did	not	have	a	clear	goal	 to	 reach;	all	 I	knew	was	 that	 it	was	
possible	to	participate	in	some	way	and	generate	a	power	that	could	
change	things.	At	that	moment	you	felt	you	had	a	lot	of	power,	because	
we	had	knocked	two	presidents	down,	we	had	another	one	in	check,	
and	also	 the	Supreme	Court	 (Male,	 9,	Asamblea	de	Palermo	Viejo,	
with	no	previous	political	experience)
power is here understood in arendtian terms, as something that comes to ex-
ist when people meet through speech and action, that is to say, when people act out 
	 	Different	assemblies	adopted	different	denominations,	in	many	cases	after	heat-
ed	arguments	about	the	profile	that	was	to	be	given	to	them.	As	Rossi	(005)	explains,	
the	label	of	“neighbor	assemblies”	emphasizes	the	shift	towards	territorial	organiza-
tion	by	those	that	although	no	longer	have	a	steady	job	able	to	produce	solidarity	and	
a	feeling	of	belonging,	still	have	a	place	of	residence	capable	of	creating	new	forms	
of	solidarity.	The	term	“popular	assemblies”,	on	the	other	hand,	underlines	the	re-
articulation	of	“the	people”	as	a	subject.	According	to	Rossi,	the	self	definition	of	an	
assembly	as	“popular”	is	linked	to	an	interpretation	of	December,	00	as	a	context	
of	crisis	of	the	capitalist	system	or	the	neoliberal	model	and	of	representative	democ-
racy	and	“partidocracia”,	and	to	an	understanding	of	the	slogan	“Que se vayan todos”	
as	the	call	for	the	creation	of	an	alternative	to	those	structures	in	crisis.	By	contrast,	
the	 self-named	 “neighborhood	assemblies”	 tend	 to	conceive	 the	crisis	as	 resulting	
from	the	persistent	and	excessive	delegation	of	authority	in	a	political	system	lacking	
effective	mechanisms	for	accountability	and	citizen	participation	and	control.	Con-
sequently,	they	interpret	the	“Que se vayan todos”	in	terms	of	the	re-legitimization	of	
political	representation	and	the	straightening	of	its	mechanisms.
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of common agreement. The assemblies –states a former member of one in Mont-
serrat– appeared simply because “people met their neighbors, people joined others 
and said ‘we must do something’, because they had the feeling that on that day 
they had gone out and done something” (female, 55). in fact, many assemblies 
were born in the same places and at the very moment when the self-summoned 
neighbors were taking part in the cacerolazos. a neighbor of olivos explains:
Where	do	you	have	 to	go	 in	order	 to	 shout	at	 the	president?	To	 the	
presidential	residence	[in	Olivos]	(…)	There	people	started	saying	‘this	
is	the	assembly	of	Olivos,	the	assembly	of	Olivos’,	and	the	same	neigh-
bors	continued	to	meet	once	and	again	and	that’s	it…
Another	interviewee	recounts	that	the	Asamblea	0	de	Diciembre	
de	Parque	Avellaneda	“started,	the	same	as	the	others,	being	a	sponta-
neous	group	of	neighbors	who	met	to	go	to	the	cacerolazos	in	Plaza	de	
Mayo	together.	(…)	After	two	weeks	of	going	to	the	cacerolazos (…)	the	
idea	started	to	emerge,	on	the	way	back,	that	we	should	meet	prior	to	
the	demonstrations,	maybe	an	hour	before,	so	as	to	plan.	Thus,	we	first	
started	being	an	assembly	so	as	to	discuss	how	we	would	go	to	the	cace-
lorazos;	and	then	other	conversations	started	to	arise”	(Male,	4,	with	
union	experience).	The	perception	that	power	resides	in	being	together	
explicitly	emerges	in	the	discourse	of	an	assembly	member	who	explains	
that	what	was	valuable	in	the	first	encounter	was	just	“the	commitment	
to	meet	again”	(Male,	45,	employee,	Asamblea	de	Palermo	Viejo).
In	spite	of	emphasizing	the	“spontaneous”	character	of	the	mush-
rooming	of	 the	assemblies,	many	of	our	 interviewees	accept	 the	 fact	
that	they	were	indeed	summoned	by	somebody.	What	they	underscore,	
instead,	is	that	the	summoning	was	done	by	“common	neighbors”	like	
themselves,	often	with	little	or	no	prior	political	experience,	who	simply	
took	the	initiative	to	write	a	poster	or	to	print	and	distribute	a	flyer	so	
as	to	originate	something	that	would	soon	grow	through	the	voluntary	
decision	of	each	adherent,	by	its	own	impulse	and	without	any	direc-
tions	or	leaderships.	According	to	many,	spontaneity	conferred	a	“genu-
ine”	character	to	a	movement	that	is	repeatedly	characterized	as	“arisen	
from	below”	and	at	the	back	of	political	parties	and	leftist	activists	and	
organizations,	who	happened	to	be	distracted,	looking	in	a	different	di-
rection.	“Although	I	had	political	experience”	–states	a	journalist–	“I	did	
not	summon	my	assembly;	four	people	with	no	experience	did.	(…)	All	
my	political	experience	notwithstanding,	I	could	not	see	the	phenom-
enon	coming,	while	they,	without	any	political	experience,	could	and	
did	take	the	initiative”	(Male,	49,	Asamblea	de	Palermo	Viejo).
Also	mentioned	once	and	again	is	the	fact	that	“people”	were	then	
available	to	respond	to	this	kind	of	call:	what	was	extraordinary	was	
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not	the	fact	that	somebody	summoned,	but	the	fact	that	so	many	peo-
ple	responded.	More	important	than	the	call	itself	was	indeed	the	fact	
that	the	process	was	not	controlled	or	directed	by	anybody.	As	is	ex-
plained	by	two	assembly	members:
Assemblies	were	 relatively	 spontaneous.	 It	 is	 just	 as	with	 the	 chant	
in	the	football	stadium:	it	is	organized	during	the	week.	The	thing	is	
whether	you	are	allowed	to	sing	it,	whether	everybody	wants	to	learn	it	
and	whether	they	sing	it	when	you	tell	them…	It	is	the	same	here.	The	
assemblies	were	summoned.	(…)	[But]	just	try	to	summon	an	assem-
bly	with	a	couple	of	flyers	and	gather	three	hundred	people	out	there	
in	 the	street…	(Male,	47,	Asamblea	0	de	Diciembre	de	Flores,	with	
political	experience)
You	found	little	signs,	‘we	neighbors	will	meet’.	Evidently	those	signs	
had	to	come	from	somewhere.	(…)	[There	were]	organizers.	However,	
this	is	just	anecdotal.	(…)	What	made	the	difference	was	the	presence	
of	neighbors	who	wanted	 to	participate,	who	felt	deceived,	unrepre-
sented	(Female,	50,	Asamblea	de	Álvarez	Jonte	y	Artigas)
Other	interviewees	maintain	that	their	assemblies	were	summoned	
by	preexisting	organizations:	those	are	the	cases	of	the	Asamblea	Popu-
lar	de	Liniers	–whose	foundations,	says	one	of	its	members,	were	set	a	
week	before	December	9th,	when	the	retailers	of	the	district	staged	a	
protest	in	Plaza	de	Mayo–;	the	assemblies	of	both	Palermo	Viejo	and	
Congreso	–which	recognize	their	origins	in	the	actions	of	a	group	of	peo-
ple	who	had	been	mobilized	for	more	than	a	year	outside	the	Congress	
in	demand	for	an	impeachment	process	against	the	Supreme	Court–;	
and	the	Asamblea	Gastón	Riva	in	Caballito,	summoned	from	a	Centro 
Cultural (Cultural	Center).	A	few	interviewees	state	that	their	respective	
assemblies	were	“proposed”	by	some	political	party,	such	as	the	Partido	
Obrero,	or	by	individual	activists	belonging	to	some	organization.	More	
numerous,	however,	are	those	who	emphasize	that	the	initiative	–both	
in	the	case	of	“common	neighbors”	and	of	activists–	took	place	as	the	
result	of	the	“demonstration	effect”	caused	by	other	assemblies	already	
in	place.	That	is,	they	contend	that	the	first	assemblies	were	doubtless	
“spontaneous”	in	the	referred	sense	of	the	term	and	that	“others	were	
later	formed	by	parties,	on	the	wave	of	the	already	existing	ones.	[But]	
there	was	already	an	objective	process	going	on”	(Male,	4,	Asamblea	
0	de	Diciembre	de	Flores,	with	prior	political	experience).	Accounts	
such	as	the	following	are	thus	common	enough:
[One	day]	I	found	an	assembly	on	the	corner	of	Castro	Barros	and	Ri-
vadavia.	The	road	was	blocked	and	there	were	twenty	or	thirty	people	
shouting	with	a	megaphone,	and	I	stayed	(…)	I	mentioned	it	to	friends	
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and	to	the	compañeros	(fellow	activists)	in	the	neighborhood	and	two	
or	 three	days	 later	we	saw	the	same	thing	going	on	 in	Cid	Campea-
dor.	 It	was	 then	 that	we	 decided	 to	 organize	 one	 in	 Flores.	We	 put	
up	a	couple	of	posters	summoning	people	to	Plaza	Aramburu	(…)	We	
thought	that	maybe	somebody	would	show	up,	and	we	found	out	that	
we	were	 two	hundred.	 (…)	We	who	had	summoned	 introduced	our-
selves	as	neighbors	and	acted	as	chairpersons.	(…)	We	used	the	same	
methodology	that	we	had	seen	in	other	places	(Male,	,	Asamblea	0	
de	Diciembre	de	Flores,	party	activist)
Once	the	assemblies	had	been	born,	the	cacerolazos	could	be	rep-
licated	thanks	to	the	organizational	resources	they	had	put	into	mo-
tion,	but	for	that	same	reason	they	started	to	lose	spontaneity,	since	
it	 was	 increasingly	 the	 assemblies	 themselves	 who	 summoned	 and	
tried	to	coordinate	them.	As	the	cacerolazos	that	had	preceded	them,	
therefore,	the	assemblies	were	soon	charged	with	two	opposite	accu-
sations:	on	one	hand,	the	motive	that	was	supposed	to	be	at	the	roots	
of	their	actions	–that	is,	the	rejection	of	the	corralito–	was	denounced	
as	despicable	or	spurious;	on	the	other	hand,	they	were	denounced	as	
left	wing	hideouts	with	shameful	political	motivations.
The	unacceptable	character	of	“material”	and	“bourgeois”	moti-
vations	as	springs	for	political	action	is	internalized	by	most	of	the	in-
terviewees,	who	thus	typically	insist	in	denying	the	first	accusation.	As	
for	the	second	one,	it	has	to	be	said	that	although	the	assemblies	were	
often	propelled,	maintained,	colonized	or	manipulated	by	political	or-
ganizations,	 the	attempts	at	cooptation	and	manipulation	tended	to	
be	fiercely	 resisted	by	 those	who	–self-defined	either	 as	 “non-politi-
cal”,	“nonpartisan”,	“indifferent	to	ideologies”	or	believers	in	politics	
understood	as	a	creative	activity	as	opposed	to	its	degradation	in	the	
hands	of	professional	politicians	and	activists–	were	sincerely	looking	
for	a	genuine	form	of	self-organization	and	deliberation.	The	persist-
ent	presence	within	the	assemblies	of	activists	from	left	wing	political	
parties	 and	 their	 tendency	 to	manipulate	 debates	 and	 to	 introduce	
and	advance	their	own	agendas	is	also	denounced	by	several	assembly	
members	as	one	of	the	main	reasons	for	the	drain	of	“neighbors”	and	
the	assemblies’	subsequent	decline.	A	young	member	of	the	Asamblea	
de	Palermo	Viejo	illustrates	it	the	following	way:
The	 neighbors	 were	 all	 here,	 we	 were	 about	 a	 hundred	 and	 twenty,	
[everything	was]	very	nice	until	we	started	to	notice	who	was	speaking	
with	the	microphone,	who	shouted	or	who	did	not	let	others	speak	or	
tried	to	impose	his	own	views.	Coincidentally,	they	all	belonged	to	cer-
tain	parties.	We	started	to	talk	about	it	and	a	whole	reaction	was	set	up	
to	prevent	cooptation	from	taking	place.	But	that	was	a	strategy	that	was	
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commonly	used	by	leftist	parties.	Because	the	assemblies	were	a	creati-
ve,	spontaneous	social	attempt:	no	visionary	from	the	avant-garde	came	
here	to	say	‘this	has	to	be	done’.	But	once	they	existed	they	wanted	to	sei-
ze	them.	(…)	Some	[participants]	admitted	that	they	belonged	to	parties	
and	others	did	not,	but	we	uncovered	them.	[It	was]	a	complicated	thing	
to	do	(Female,	9,	sociologist,	with	little	prior	political	experience)
“some of us were acquainted with those practices because we had also em-
braced them in the past”, states a member of the asamblea de palermo Viejo 
(male, 49, with prior political and partisan experience, currently an anti-global-
ization activist). “We who had some experience with that” –recalls an assembly 
member from Flores– “were all day identifying them. They all came to the as-
semblies, and a feeling grew that still persists among the population: a rejection 
against the party model and structures. You could not mention that you belonged 
to a party” (male, 47, with prior political and partisan experience). explains an-
other politically experienced assembly member of palermo Viejo:
In	the	second	or	third	meeting,	a	youth	came	who	evidently	had	politi-
cal	experience	and	said	‘we	must	organize	committees	and	begin	to	give	
ourselves	some	structure’.	The	majority	did	not	want	anything	structu-
red.	(…)	The	mistake	made	by	most	leftist	parties	[was]	not	to	unders-
tand	that	they	were	facing	a	novel	phenomenon	and	that	they	were	not	
the	avant-garde	but	marched	at	the	rearguard	instead.	(…)	They	bear	a	
strong	responsibility	for	the	decline	of	the	assemblies,	because	they	in-
troduced	debates	that	people	were	not	interested	in,	debates	related	to	
their	own	political	characterization	of	the	situation.	Each	leftist	party	
tried	to	push	the	assembly	towards	their	side,	because	there	was	a	com-
petition	among	left-wing	parties	to	see	who	had	more	assemblies.	They	
thought	that	[the	assemblies]	were	soviets	that	needed	to	be	led.
praised by those who saw them as a superior evolutionary stage after the 
spontaneous cacerolazos and criticized by those who considered them as the 
cause for the loss of the vigor and the innocence of the spontaneous, the assem-
blies were undoubtedly one of the most novel practices grown amidst the heat of 
the representation crisis that had so violently erupted towards the end of 2001. 
The assembly movement contained an unusual revealing power of the nature of 
the crisis from which it had emerged as well as a potential for innovation beyond 
the dominant political practices. The assemblies were sites for the production 
both of discourse about a highly problematic representative bond and of political 
practices directed towards the search either of complements or of alternatives 
to the current practices of political representation. in other words, its prolifera-
tion around the end of 2001 and the beginning of 2002 can be simultaneously 
understood as a symptom of the crisis of representation (and of the economic 
and social crisis as well) and –due to its nature as a producer of discourse and 
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practices related to representation– as a factor leading to the further denunciation 
and deliberate deepening of that crisis.
The assemblies were not as massive as the cacerolazos had been, because 
–unlike the latter– they demanded from their members time, patience, rhetorical 
abilities, organizational skills and/or interest in political debate. participation in 
the cacerolazos was accessible to anyone: the only requisite was to have some 
reason for complaint and to go out with a pan to express it in a space that did not 
have nor could have had any hierarchy, as there would be in the assemblies as soon 
as “natural leaderships” began to emerge. however, less than three months after 
December 19th the number of assemblies had already surpassed a hundred in the 
city of buenos aires, with a similar number in the Great buenos aires. between 
January and february, 2002 forty assemblies had also been founded in the province 
of santa fe, approximately ten in córdoba and seven more in four other provinces. 
still, the assembly movement is described by our interviewees as a “phenomenon 
of the capital city [of buenos aires]”. “We cannot say that it was a national process, 
because it was not so, but at the moment it did have national connotations because 
it was widely amplified and expanded from a political point of view” (Male, 47, 
retailer, asamblea popular de liniers, with large political experience).
Despite its low quantitative incidence –retrospectively admitted by numer-
ous interviewees, who speak of dozens or maybe a hundred members in neighbor-
hoods with tens of thousands inhabitants– the prevailing feeling throughout the 
first weeks of assembly life was that “anything could happen”, that “any change 
was possible”. “it had a multiplying effect, people came, invited neighbors, print-
ed flyers”, explains a former member of the Asamblea de Palermo Viejo (Female, 
44, with no prior political experience). “You walked by the neighborhoods and 
found assemblies here and there”, recounts a former member of the asamblea de 
flores sur. “it was impressive, everybody took part in an assembly, you went on 
the subway and you met the same people that you met at the Interbarrial, and it 
was quite a strange feeling, an effervescence” (female, 38, with prior political 
and partisan experience). at the same time, however, many of those assembly 
members were already aware of the limits of the process as they found difficulties 
in mobilizing the people who were not yet mobilized:
What	we	 saw	 as	 we	walked	 [during	 demonstrations]	 is	 that	 people	
were	on	the	balconies,	they	waved	but	remained	there.	There	was	no	
way	to	get	them	down	to	the	street	(…)	There	was	a	slogan	those	days	
that	went:	‘Turn	the	TV	off	and	come	out’.	One	of	the	memories	I	have	
is	 of	 the	 buildings	 along	Rivadavia	Avenue	with	 the	windows	 open.	
The	country	[was]	in	flames	and	people	[were]	comfortably	watching	
television.	It	is	a	terrible	image;	it	made	us	angry	and	impotent	when	
we	saw	that	people	did	not	react	(Male,	4,	Asamblea	de	Pedro	Goyena	
y	Puán,	with	no	prior	political	experience)
as far as their composition, procedures and mechanisms (more or less hori-
zontal, more or less pluralistic) were concerned, the assemblies were so different 
Democratic Innovation in the South
90
from each other and internally heterogeneous as the concert of pans had been. 
Their initiatives were varied and diverse as well, ranging from the publishing of 
newspapers and bulletins or the broadcasting of radio programs to the organiza-
tion of “escraches” (graffiti protests) against politicians or the organization, coor-
dination and participation in diverse forms of protest, and including the opening 
of soup kitchens, the organization of communitarian food purchases, the elabora-
tion and distribution of all kinds of goods through local cooperatives aiming both 
at promoting self-sufficiency and autonomy and at preserving or creating jobs. 
Their mottos and demands were also as wide and diverse as the cacerolazos’ had 
been: general elections now, support for the piquetero movement (through the 
slogan “piquete y cacerola, la lucha es una sola” –“pickets and pans, the struggle 
is the same one”), participatory budgeting, the creation of mechanisms for deci-
sion-making by neighbors at the local level, the nationalization of the banking 
system, the re-nationalization of previously privatized utilities companies, the 
decision not to pay the external debt, the removal of supreme court Justices, the 
revocation of all mandates and the summoning of a national constituent assem-
bly, the end of the “corralito”, various reclamations to local and provincial gov-
ernments (ranging from the cession of physical space for meetings and activities 
to the yielding of food or medicine for distribution). among them it was possible 
to identify concrete and immediate demands related to the social crisis; classic 
vindications of small leftist parties, such as the rejection of the obligations de-
rived from the external debt; demands stemming from the negative re-interpreta-
tion of the structural reforms undertaken throughout the nineties; and, last but not 
least, many others that were the direct expression of the crisis of representation.
Political representation and the assemblies
according to their members
The discourse produced by the assemblies on the issue of political representation 
also varied widely. it included reformist stances in demand of a renovation that 
could “clean” the representative system of its evils and allow it to function cor-
rectly, as well as radically contesting positions based on the idea that representa-
tive devices were inherently evil as they had been designed precisely with the aim 
of moving the people away from a power that was rightly theirs but that makes 
domination unstable when exercised.
in the next pages we try to elucidate what political representation meant for 
assembly members; how doomed they thought it was; what their demands were in 
relation to its unfulfilled promises; and what alternatives they perceived. Did they 
demand a “more representative” democracy? or, on the contrary, did they want 
to turn democracy into a “more direct” one? in other words: how did assembly-
	 	In	the	city	of	Buenos	Aires,	however,	the	assemblies’	socioeconomic	profile	was	
defined	enough:	they	existed	in	greater	quantities	in	middle-	and	upper	middle-class	
districts	such	as	Belgrano,	Almagro,	Palermo	and	Flores.
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members reflect about their own assemblies? How did they understand the rela-
tionships they maintained with political parties and government institutions? Did 
they think of the assemblies as an alternative or as a supplement to other forms of 
mediation between society and the state? Did they accept the possibility of devel-
oping their activities within the framework of the existing representative institu-
tions? Did they consider them as an additional and more effective form of “citizen 
control”? Did they perceive in them some echo of other well-known participatory 
experiences, such as the brazilian participatory budgeting? Did they allow for any 
space for representation, or did they radically reject all forms of representation? 
Did they propose any specific practices at the neighborhood level that could make 
it possible to completely get rid of the distance between the rulers and the ruled?
Que se vayan todos
The motto “Que se vayan todos” (QSVT) first uttered on the rebellious final days 
of 2001 has ever since been subject to a great variety of journalistic, academic 
and political interpretations. Those interpretations are continuously framed and 
re-framed by assembly members, who thereby relate in quite different ways to 
the system of political representation.
a bulky set of interviewees maintains that the QsVT must be literally in-
terpreted. nevertheless, few of them state that the slogan simply demanded that 
“absolutely all of them” went away so as “to start anew right now” (female, 36, 
ex-asamblea de flores sur, with limited prior political experience). instead, the 
vast majority gives some specification as for the content of the expression “all”, 
which usually translates as “all those who hold seats”, “the politicians of the sys-
tem”, “the corrupt, treacherous politicians” or “the ones that have always ruled 
us”. others take a little step further to state that “all” those that should go were 
“the members of the political corporation, the judges” or those who held posi-
tions in “the three branches of the system”. What the slogan demanded was –as 
an assembly member of Almagro puts it– that “not only the politicians who have 
always ruled us and still do” should leave, “but also the whole political class, 
supposedly representative of the citizenry, which means all political institutions, 
the church, unions… the whole old way of doing politics based on clientelism, 
on the idea that ‘i give you this money, now vote for me’” (male, 36, with no 
prior political experience). in that sense, the target was “old politics” and the 
reclamation was, as some make it explicit, of a “renovation of parties” (female, 
50, asamblea de Álvarez Jonte y artigas, with little prior political experience). 
This reclamation stretched to include, after the assemblies’ experience, also the 
parties of the left, even though the latter “do not feel that the message concerns 
them, they [behave] as if they had nothing to do with it” (male, 65, ex-asamblea 
de palermo Viejo, with no prior political experience)4.
4	 	The	 left	 is	 the	 target	 of	 accusations	 of	 a	 different	nature	 from	 those	directed	
against	the	rest	of	the	parties,	blamed	for	colonizing	the	state	apparatus	with	its	cor-
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among those who interpret the slogan literally are those who no longer ap-
prehend it in terms of a “renovation” –understood either as the replacement of the 
people in charge or as the substitution of the old criticized practices– but in terms 
of the replacement of the system of representation with “another democracy”, 
described by some as “direct”, by others as “participative” and still by others as 
“more representative” than the existing one. The refusal to interpret the slogan 
as a demand for a “mere exchange of faces” is in many cases explicit; thus, for 
example, a former member of the asamblea de lanús declares that QsVT meant 
“that all the rulers had to go away but also that nobody had to come to take their 
place (…) [although] i cannot imagine what it would be like to be organized that 
way” (female, 32, with brief prior political experience). in the words of an as-
sembly member from parque avellaneda:
[QSVT]	is	a	slogan-guideline	for	the	construction	of	a	popular	force	of	
a	different	type.	In	that	sense	it	seems	to	us	that	the	model	of	Mosconi	
is	the	most	advanced	in	our	country.	It	seems	to	us	that	there	are	other	
models	to	study,	such	as	that	of	Brazil’s	Landless	Workers’	Movement,	
the	Zapatistas,	 the	Colombian	 guerrilla,	 the	 coca	 growers	 in	 the	 te-
rritories	where	they	function	as	a	real	popular	power	(Male,	4,	with	
union	experience)
Generally speaking, this position involves the vision of assemblies as an 
alternative to representative democracy. In the Asamblea de Palermo Viejo –re-
members one of its members “the phrase had been extended by saying ‘every-
body should go away, we’ll be in charge’” (female, 65, with no prior political 
experience). The same extended phrase is cited by an assembly member from 
pompeya, for whom it conveyed a clear message to politicians: “you cannot ad-
minister anything anymore”. “politicians”, he explained, “are dreadful. in thirty 
rupt,	clientelistic	practices.	According	to	most	of	our	interviewees,	the	left	has	sinned	
by	default,	due	to	its	inability	to	take	advantage	of	“historical	opportunities”.	Says,	
for	example,	a	member	of	the	Asamblea	de	Álvarez	Jonte	y	Artigas	that	leftist	parties	
“are	responsible	for	the	fact	that	nobody	has	gone	away,	for	the	fact	that	a	popular	
force	was	not	formed”,	that	is,	“for	the	inexistence	of	a	popular	organization	repre-
senting	the	population”	(Female,	50,	with	brief	prior	political	experience).	“I	do	not	
have	anything	against	the	left,	I	also	consider	myself	a	leftist”,	explains	an	assembly	
member	of	Pompeya,	“[but]	 the	 left	 let	go	of	a	historical	opportunity	 to	create	an	
alternative	with	the	assembly	movement”	(Male,	57,	with	prior	political	experience).	
Consequently,	the	fact	that	they	have	not	had	power	with	which	to	do	wrong	does	not	
exempt	the	left	from	its	share	of	responsibility;	on	the	contrary,	it	is	held	accountable	
for	its	very	inability	to	build	power.	As	one	of	our	interviewees	reminds	us,	we	are	
talking	about	parties	that	obtain	less	than	%	of	the	vote,	which	means	that	“they	do	
not	have	a	very	positive	sense	of	[political]	construction”.	The	same	inability	is	ap-
parent	in	their	behavior	within	the	assemblies,	guided	by	the	objective	of	recruiting	
a	handful	of	new	activists	rather	than	of	carrying	on	any	tangible	project	(Male,	65,	
ex-Asamblea	de	Palermo	Viejo,	with	no	prior	political	experience).
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years they have not found the solution. They prostituted the branches of the gov-
ernment, they led 50% of the people under the poverty line, and corruption is 
structural” (male, 57, with prolonged prior political experience).
A second set of interviewees, equally numerous as the first one, attaches 
to the QSVT a metaphorical sense, that is, a figurative, non-literal meaning that 
eases the comprehension of the phenomenon in question. in the words of a for-
mer member of the asamblea de montserrat:
[QSVT	was]	a	metaphor	like	that	of	the	Mothers	of	Plaza	de	Mayo,	‘Apa-
rición	con	vida’	(‘Reappearance	with	life’).	That	is,	everybody	knows	that	
they	are	dead,	but	‘Reappearance	with	life’	is	the	slogan,	the	strong	line,	
and	this	‘Que	se	vayan	todos’	seems	similar	to	me,	because	I	personally	
cannot	believe…	Who	has	to	go	away?	How?	Why?	Who	stays?	And	who	
will	come	instead?	(Female,	55,	with	prior	political	experience)
as a metaphor, two main characteristics are attributed to the slogan. on one 
hand, a great capacity of symbolizing weariness, disgust and rejection towards rep-
resentatives, the representative system and even the “system” as a whole. it was, 
according to various present and former assembly participants, “a catharsis through 
refusal”, “a shout of protest and [a way] of setting a position”, “a cry of revolt”. it was 
“just an expression, a way of saying ‘we are fed up of this and we still do not know 
how to change it; we are simply fed up and we show it’”, says a member of the asam-
blea 20 de Diciembre de flores (male, 33, party activist). “it was very visceral”, con-
firms a former member of the Asamblea del Botánico. “There was no deeper analysis 
than that. it was a rebellion cry, like a rubber that you stretch to its maximum to see 
how much it bounces back. it did not stretch much because in fact they are all still 
here…” (male, 48, unemployed, with limited prior political experience).
on the other hand, the slogan is characterized by its synthetic power and 
its inclusive potential. it was “a synthesis like those that fans make in soccer 
matches”, according to a member of an assembly of flores who provides the fol-
lowing explanation:
[The	 phrase]	was	 coined	 in	 the	 streets.	 ‘Everybody	 should	 go	 away’	
means	 ‘That’s	enough!’	It	is	a	translation,	it	is	not	literal.	It	does	not	
mean	that	we	are	going	to	go	and	kill	the	referee’s	mother,	no.	(…)	It	
was	a	simple	phrase:	it	didn’t	mean	that	all	of	them	had	to	go,	all,	all,	
all,	all	the	sons	of	a	bitch	who	negotiate	behind	the	backs	of	the	people,	
who	profit	as	much	as	they	do,	who	live	isolated,	who	work	against	the	
interests	of	the	already	damned,	who	don’t	give	a	damn	about	anybody,	
who	keep	indebting	the	country	(…)	Some	of	us	said	‘Let’s	go	further,	
let’s	make	the	revolution’,	[there	were]	others	who	wanted	superficial	
reforms,	but	the	‘Que	se	vayan	todos’	included	us	all	(Male,	47,	Asam-
blea	0	de	Diciembre	de	Flores,	with	political	experience)
some interviewees consider the amplitude of the slogan to be a positive trait as it 
allowed it to encompass diverse reclamations; they also contend that the phrase becomes 
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a “double-edged sword” when literally understood. others, however, use the very same 
expression to refer to the dangers involved in a slogan so “vague” and “diffuse” so as to 
encompass everybody, and therefore ready to be “appropriated by the right”.
Our interviewees –both those who understand the phrase in some literal 
way and those who emphasize its metaphorical character– are also divided as to 
whether they think the slogan is still valid, if it ever was so. in fact, some of them 
claim that they never supported it or that they stopped doing so long ago, for one 
of many reasons: its irresponsible, insufficient, excessive or negative character, or 
the obvious inevitability of its failure. There are also some (few) who reject the 
first part of the phrase –the passivity of the idea that they should go away– when in 
fact, they say, it was necessary that we got rid of them all. conversely, others (also 
in small numbers) oppose the idea that everybody should go away based on the 
argument that not all politicians are the same. “There were people [in congress] 
who, from my point of view, had performed well (…) i [even] suspected that [the 
slogan] might have been invented by the right so as to create a situation in which 
everything was mixed, everything was put at the same level”, suggests a former 
assembly member from caballito (male, 43, with no prior political experience).
As for the “irresponsible” character of the slogan, it is affirmed with at least 
two different senses. on one hand, the expression is considered to be irrespon-
sible in that “it locates responsibility outside us. [That way] nothing gets fixed. [It 
is as when we say] ‘i did not vote for him’, ‘i do not have anything to do with it’, 
‘it has been like that for a long time’” (female, 23, student, ex-asamblea de pal-
ermo Viejo, with little prior political experience). The slogan is also denounced 
as a “whim”, a result of the temporary urgencies of “the same people [who now] 
go to the demonstrations [in demand for a “zero-tolerance” policy against crime] 
led by Blumberg” (who is systematically identified by the interviewees as “right-
ist”) (female, 26, ex-asamblea de lanús, with no prior political experience). on 
the other hand, the phrase is considered to be a product of the “unconsciousness”, 
the “lack of thought” about the results of its eventual application. “You can’t 
tell everybody to go away because if you are governed then comes mr. George 
W. [bush] and tells you: ‘i will rule for you’”, says a former member of the 
asamblea de olivos (female, 45, volunteer in a popular library, with political ex-
perience and party affiliation). However, the most common reference to the irre-
sponsibility of the phrase –described as “ridiculous”, “childish”, “misadjusted”, 
“impulsive” and “meaningless” – appears in between interrogation marks: “If 
everybody goes away, who is going to come?” The question is frequently asked 
alongside the ascertainment of the assemblies’ failure at “occupying the space” of 
those who had to go, and/or of the failure of “the people” at organizing an alterna-
tive and rising up to the challenge that was the result of their own demands.
The phrase is denounced either for its excessive (and, therefore, impossible) 
character or for its insufficiency. “Nobody went away”, states a member of the 
asamblea Gastón riva. “These all-or-nothing positions are all the same, and it 
ends up this way. We wanted everything and we got nothing” (male, 32, with 
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little prior political experience). Those who consider the slogan to be insufficient, 
on the other hand, are mostly party activists and assembly members with a vast 
prior political and partisan experience who criticize the alleged reformist stance 
of the vast majority of the mobilized citizenry:
[The	 slogan]	 said	 ‘all	 politicians	 should	go	away’,	 but	 it	 did	not	 say	
[that]	the	parliamentary	system	is	an	indirect	system	of	delegation	of	
politics	and	that	as	long	as	you	vote	for	somebody	who	is	not	revocable	
and	can	do	whatever	he	wants	in	between	elections,	it	is	a	great	politi-
cal	renunciation.	(…)	The	assembly	wanted	everybody	to	go	away	but	
it	did	not	want	to	change	the	system	(Male,	47,	member	of	the	Asam-
blea	Popular	de	Liniers,	with	experience	in	activism)
The insufficiency of the slogan is also linked to its “exclusively negative” charac-
ter. consequently, the lack of a “positive” alternative is pointed out as a problem 
by many assembly members –mostly party activists– who claim to have tried to 
solve it by organizing groups parallel to the assemblies whose aim was to allow 
for “strategic political discussion”.
in any case, the majority of our interviewees consider that as for its practi-
cal effects, the slogan was a failure. “nothing changed”, “nobody went away”, 
“little changed so nothing fundamental was changed” are some of the expressions 
typically used. A few people, however, affirm that assemblies were instrumental 
in changing the vision of previously passive citizens and in creating a sort of 
state of alert, as well as greater sensitivity and responsiveness on the part of the 
government elected in 2003. The latter is indeed recognized by many as having 
picked up through words and deeds the heritage left by the demands originally 
put forward by caceroleros and asambleístas.
Assemblies and representative institutions
The relationship with the local government
A minority of our interviewees emphatically affirm that their assemblies main-
tained no relationship with the Centro de Gestión y Participación (cGp)5 in the 
neighborhood because they wanted to remain faithful to the QsVT, thus rejecting 
all relationship with the government, political parties and institutions in general. 
a member of an assembly of flores recalls:
5	 	These	Centers	for	Administration	and	Participation	are	decentralized	adminis-
trative	units	of	 the	city	government	of	Buenos	Aires	where	neighbors	can	process	
paperwork,	have	access	to	social,	cultural	or	educational	services,	make	denuncia-
tions	about	violated	rights	or	make	reclamations	related	to	public	services	and	utili-
ties	companies.	The	CGPs	are	announced	on	the	local	government’s	web	page	as	“a	
channel	for	neighbors’	participation	through	different	mechanisms	that	promote	col-
lective	agency	and	the	concerted	search	for	solutions”	and	as	“a	tool	for	the	effective	
control	of	the	administration”	(http://www.buenosaires.gov.ar/areadecentralization).
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We	were	all	quite	radicalized.	There	was	a	committee	for	institutional	
relations	that	was	stigmatized	as	the	‘right	wing’	of	the	assembly.	First	
thing	they	wanted	to	do	was	to	enter	into	a	relationship	with	the	CGP,	
the	Church	and	the	police.	Can	you	imagine,	at	that	time…	The	police	
had	been	repressing	us	for	a	month,	the	CGP	did	not	even	exist	for	us,	
the	government	was	an	empty	shell	and	the	Church	was	not	considered	
to	be	a	progressive	institution	open	to	dialogue	(Male,	4,	with	brief	
prior	political	experience)
in contrast, many others declare that their assemblies went through severe internal 
conflict about whether to accept or reject anything offered by the CGP; about 
whether to make requests, or demands, or even to “just go and seize” whatever 
resources were considered to belong to “the people” by their own right –such as a 
place to meet. still more numerous are those who categorically maintain that their 
assemblies had some kind of relationship with the cGp or with the city govern-
ment (and, to a lesser extent, with other institutions). Those relations were, accord-
ing to the majority, “unavoidable”, of a utilitarian nature and based on “permanent 
demand”. from this perspective, the cGp was a mere source from which diverse 
resources could be “obtained” or, better still, “taken”; a place where requests or 
demands could be directed and that could be repudiated or even attacked if de-
mands were not appropriately met. This sort of relationship is frequently (though 
not always) defined as “conflictive”6. only a handful of interviewees describe a 
relationship that was “friendly” or “adult” due to a certain ideological affinity, to 
“governmental good will”, to the recognition by the assembly of some virtue in 
certain official policies, or to mutual respect. The obtaining of resources (physi-
cal space, food to distribute or to feed the soup kitchen, social plans, housing 
subsidies, etc.) or of favorable decisions such as the recognition and legalization 
of assemblies’ activities are consequently understood mainly as the effect of the 
“struggle” led by the assemblies and of their “pressures” on a government de-
picted either as in need of “cleaning its public image” or as “scared” by social 
convulsion. a member of the asamblea de parque avellaneda recounts:
We	had	a	meeting	with	people	from	the	department	of	food	policies.	
[It	was]	the	first	time	that	we	had	contact	with	government	officials.	
At	that	time	people	 in	the	city	government	were	scared,	and	whene-
ver	they	felt	threatened	by	the	possibility	of	a	demonstration	they	just	
6	 	In	some	cases	the	relationship	with	the	government	and	parties	was	even	seen	as	
“dangerous”	for	at	least	two	reasons.	Firstly,	this	relationship	caused	-according	to	
several	interviewees-	“bossy	tendencies”	in	some	assemblies	and	resulted	in	the	co-
optation	of	assembly	members	by	parties	and	governmental	structures.	Secondly,	the	
availability	of	resources	coming	from	the	government	faced	many	assemblies	with	a	
dilemma	that	produced	severe	internal	conflicts.	Should	they	receive	and	distribute,	
let’s	say,	food	supplies?	In	case	they	did,	would	they	be	able	to	do	it	in	such	a	way	that	
did	not	contradict	their	convictions	opposed	to	clientelism	and	“old	politics”?
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threw	[food]	boxes	to	you	out	of	the	window.	(…)	So	thirteen	assem-
blies	went	to	see	them	and	we	told	them	that	we	had	soup	kitchens	and	
many	social	services,	 that	we	needed	food	and	[asked	them	whether	
they	preferred	to	have	a	good	or	a	bad	relationship	with	us].	So	we	got	
periodical	deliveries	of	food,	and	later	we	demanded	premises	to	work	
in	(Male,	4,	with	union	experience)
Besides	the	relationship	of	permanent	demand	already	described,	other	
interviewees	refer	to	a	more	stable	involvement	within	the	framework	
of	certain	governmental	initiatives	–particularly	the	so-called	“partici-
patory	budgeting”	and	the	Bill	of	Communes.	Again,	two	approaches	
can	be	 identified,	one	more	sincerely	 involved	with	the	process	and	
another	one	of	a	more	instrumental	nature.	Most	of	our	interviewees	
identify	with	the	latter.	Among	assembly	members	who	responded	to	
the	abovementioned	government	initiatives,	the	vast	majority	recog-
nizes	that	they	did	it	in	full	knowledge	that	they	were	“a	big	farce”	or	
a	“mockery	of	participative	democracy”.	They	did	so,	then,	as	a	means	
of	accumulating	power	or	achieving	other	aims	unrelated	to	the	proc-
ess	itself.	“We	want	to	rule”,	says	a	member	of	the	Asamblea	de	San	
Telmo.	In	order	to	achieve	it	“we	took	advantage	of	all	resources	avail-
able,	even	the	most	despicable	ones.	Such	as	participatory	budgeting”	
(Male,	5).	The	usefulness	of	which	resides,	according	to	a	member	of	
the	Asamblea	0	de	Diciembre	de	Flores,	in	that	“it	is	an	institutional	
device	that	gives	us	the	chance	to	talk	to	the	people	in	the	neighbor-
hood”	(Male,	4,	with	political	experience).	According	to	a	member	
of	its	homonym	of	Parque	Avellaneda,	its	usefulness	was	located	in	it	
being	a	sort	of	echo	chamber	that	allowed	for	unrelated	reclamations	
to	be	expressed	and	heard	(Male,	4,	with	union	experience).
Few	interviewees	give	some	credit	to	the	government’s	initiatives	
and	find	them	a	real	possibility	for	the	democratization	of	the	politi-
cal	system.	An	assembly	member	of	Castro	Barros	and	Rivadavia,	for	
instance,	 says	 he	 regularly	worked	 “jointly	with	 the	Committee	 for	
Decentralization	of	the	Legislature	of	the	City	of	Buenos	Aires”	based	
on	the	idea	that	it	was	possible	to	introduce	“more	direct	mechanisms	
of	democratic	participation	[because]	to	go	and	vote	once	every	two	
years	is	useless”	(Male,	6,	with	no	prior	political	experience).	In	the	
same	vein,	a	member	of	the	Espacio	Asambleario	de	Parque	Patricios	
explains	that	“the	City	of	Buenos	Aires	has	the	most	progressive	Con-
stitution	in	the	country,	where	participative	democracy	is	mentioned”	
(Male,	54,	with	wide	political	experience);	 that	 is	 the	reason	why	 it	
was	worth	the	trouble	of	taking	part	in	the	process	in	order	to	see	how	
much	could	be	obtained	from	it.	The	outcome	is,	nevertheless,	most	
often	negatively	evaluated:
Democratic Innovation in the South
98
[The	de-centralization	of	the	city	government	through	communes]	en-
ded	up	being	codified	at	the	time	of	the	assemblies’	decline,	[so]	what	
was	left	of	[it]	is	very	limited:	it	grants	the	neighbor	very	little	influen-
ce	on	decisions.	He	 is	consulted,	but	he	does	not	decide.	 (…)	Those	
are	the	participation	mechanisms	recommended	by	the	World	Bank,	
which	seek	to	involve	people	but	keep	decisions	within	the	centers	of	
power.	People	are	involved	so	they	believe	they	participate	and	decide	
while	in	fact	there	is	manipulation	(Male,	47,	member	of	the	Asamblea	
Popular	de	Liniers,	with	prior	political	experience)
Assemblies	tend	to	be	considered	as	an	alternative	to	the	local	govern-
ment	by	 those	who	 take	 the	 greatest	 distance	 from	 it,	 and	particu-
larly	by	those	among	them	who	have	more	political	experience	and	
belong	to	assemblies	that	identify	themselves	as	“popular”	rather	than	
“neighbors’”.	For	this	subgroup	of	interviewees	assemblies	were	a	sort	
of	“counter	power”	or	“double	power”.	On	one	hand,	they	underline	
that	in	the	midst	of	the	crisis	the	assemblies	took	upon	themselves	a	
series	of	functions	that	were	in	fact	the	government’s	job.	On	the	other	
hand,	they	mention	the	fact	that	many	neighbors	would	resort	to	the	
assemblies	as	if	they	really	were	the	government.	Some	conclude	that	
it	is	precisely	the	experience	thus	gained	that	helped	their	assemblies	
build	governmental	capabilities:
[The	education	and	health	committees]	started	studying	the	law	in	order	
to	change	it	(…)	They	tried	to	get	involved	with	the	problems	of	life,	with	
the	real	problems	that	all	neighbors	had.	There	were	potential	elements	
of	a	double	power.	There	is	a	power	that	is	institutional,	the	one	of	the	
state;	and	there	is	another	power	of	a	popular	type	that	is	built	from	below	
(Male,	47,	Asamblea	Popular	de	Liniers,	with	prior	political	experience)
We	were	a	counter	power	at	the	time.	There	were	people	who	came	to	
us	and	raised	issues	as	if	we	were	a	government	office	(…)	They	did	
not	go	to	the	CGP,	they	came	to	us	in	order	to	ask	for	things	that	were	
obviously	processed	 in	 the	CGP	 (Female,	 ,	 ex-Asamblea	de	Flores	
Sur,	with	prior	political	experience)
[Lists	the	varied	activities	developed	by	his	assembly]	That	is,	we	must	
get	ready	for	one	day	(…)	to	be	able	to	administer	the	government.	[So	
we	need]	to	learn	how	things	are	done.	And	believe	me,	we	are	at	pre-
sent	in	a	situation,	I	don’t	know	if	to	administer	the	city,	but	to	handle	
a	commune	for	sure”	(Male,	57,	Asamblea	Popular	de	Pompeya,	with	
prior	political	experience)
The	fact	that	neighbors	resorted	to	the	assemblies	to	find	solutions	
to	their	problems,	however,	is	not	necessarily	interpreted	as	a	sign	that	
assemblies	were	treated	as	if	they	were	“the	neighborhood’s	govern-
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ment”,	as	one	interviewee	puts	it.	In	fact,	other	interviewees	interpret	
that	occurrence	as	a	sign	that	assemblies	were	a	kind	of	“neighbors’	
union”,	a	“different	point	of	reference”	who	acted	on	behalf	of	neigh-
bors	and	was	recognized	as	such	by	the	local	CGP	(Male,	54,	Asamblea	
de	Parque	Patricios,	with	political	experience).
The need for the State
Above	the	intention	of	occupying	the	state	apparatus,	eliminating	it	
and/or	replacing	it	a	demand	predominates	among	our	interviewees	
that	the	State	fulfill	its	due	functions.	In	fact,	strictly	anarchist	inter-
pretations	of	the	QSVT	are	almost	if	not	completely	absent;	instead,	
there	are	numerous	indications	of	 the	 importance	that	 is	attributed	
to	the	State.	Some	even	admit	that	it	might	not	be	so	desirable	after	
all	that	everybody	goes	away.	That	is	the	case	of	the	former	member	
of	 the	Asamblea	 de	 Pedro	Goyena	 y	 Puán	who	 remembers	 that	 on	
December	0th,	00,	he	was	scared	when	“seeing	those	people	break	
the	door	and	enter	the	Congress	building	(…)	It	gave	me	the	idea	that	
everybody	had	 left	 (…)	There	was	governmental	 chaos	and	nobody	
was	in	charge	of	keeping	the	situation	under	control	(Male,	4,	with	
no	prior	political	experience).	
The	need	for	a	State	capable	of	encompassing	and	regulating	the	
social	realm	is	raised	in	the	first	place	through	a	stark	contrast	with	
the	limitations	found	by	the	assemblies:
We	think	that	there	must	be	a	State	that	establishes	a	law	(…)	Self-emplo-
yment	and	other	similar	programs	[undertaken	by	assemblies]	are	non-
sense	 if	not	accompanied	by	an	 integral	policy	by	 the	State	 (Male,	4,	
Asamblea	0	de	Diciembre	de	Parque	Avellaneda,	with	union	experience)
We	are	not	against	the	State;	we	want	a	State	that	is	for	us,	which	is	a	
different	thing.	(…)	The	State	must	be	present	in	people’s	lives;	it	must	
come	back	from	its	retreat.	As	citizens	we	demand	the	presence	of	a	
State	that	is	there	to	make	regulations,	that	is	really	in	charge	of	public	
affairs	(Female,	9,	Asamblea	de	Palermo	Viejo)
From	 this	 perspective,	 assemblies	 are	 seen	 as	ad hoc	 solutions	
found	by	neighbors	in	a	context	of	“neglect	and	the	desertion	by	the	
State,	in	hospitals,	in	schools”	(Female,	50,	Asamblea	de	Álvarez	Jonte	
y	Artigas,	with	brief	political	experience).
The	need	for	the	State	is	additionally	recognized,	after	the	assem-
blies’	 experience,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 discovery	 that	 “voluntarism	 has	
limits”,	as	an	assembly	member	puts	it.	Particularly	noteworthy	is	the	
newly	acquired	recognition	of	the	need	for	professional	politicians,	that	
is,	for	individuals	whose	main	occupation	is	related	to	public	affairs,	
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which	is	not	within	constant	reach	for	“common	citizens”.	Typically,	
our	interviewees	start	describing	the	routine	of	an	average	assembly	
member	during	the	peak	months	of	the	movement	as	“very	demand-
ing”,	“tiring”	and	“exhausting”,	since	when	adding	up	plenary	sessions,	
committee	meetings,	mobilizations	and	all	other	activities,	“you	were	
there	all	week	long”.	“Normal”	tasks	and	relationships	–work,	home,	
study,	family	and	friends	prior	to	those	made	in	the	assembly–	were	
temporarily	neglected;	“you	lived	for	the	assembly”,	they	claim.	“It	is	
necessary	to	be	there	twenty-four	hours	a	day	and	people	also	need	to	
live	their	lives”,	explains	an	activist	from	Pompeya	(Male,	57,	with	pri-
or	political	experience).	“We	are	not	wage-earning	politicians.	Going	
to	these	meetings	or	doing	solidarity	work	implies	effort	and	time	for	
people	who	have	scores	of	other	things	to	do”	(Female,	50,	Asamblea	
de	Álvarez	Jonte	y	Artigas,	with	brief	prior	political	experience).
The	 problem	 of	 time	 further	 intensified	 as	 assembly	 members	
started	to	undertake	demanding	tasks	of	the	kind	that	is	usually	left	in	
the	hands	of	politicians,	such	as	the	preparation	of	bills.	Thus,	for	ex-
ample,	a	member	of	the	Asamblea	del	Botánico	remembers	that	when	
he	started	 to	get	 involved	 in	 the	project	 to	reform	the	city’s	Code	of	
Misdemeanours	(Código Contravencional) he	“was	almost	completely	
devoted	to	the	assembly”	(Male,	4,	unemployed,	with	some	previous	
political	experience).	“You	needed	to	be	an	almost	full-time	activist”,	
an	assembly	member	from	Flores	recalls.	“The	dynamics	is	obviously	
tiring	and	it	can	be	sustained	by	a	very	small	group	of	comrades	(com-
pañeros).	(…)	The	present	assembly	is	the	product,	say,	in	0	or	90%,	
of	the	Committee	of	the	Unemployed,	because	it	was	the	most	dynamic	
committee,	the	one	that	did	more	things”	(Male,	4,	with	prior	political	
experience).	Many	 interviewees	 indeed	confirm	 that	 they	could	only	
keep	that	pace	while	their	vacations	lasted	or	as	long	as	they	were	un-
employed.	As	the	above	quoted	assembly	member	explains,	“we	were	
all	day	involved	in	politics	in	the	Plaza	because	we	didn’t	have	a	job”.
Assembly	members	were	not	activists	to	begin	with;	in	fact,	it	was	
precisely	its	proclamation	as	a	movement	of	the	“common	citizens”	
which	 conferred	 its	 peculiar	 character	 to	 the	 assembly	movement.	
The	distinction	between	an	assembly	member	and	an	activist	is	thus	
underlined	by	our	interviewees:
An	assembly	member	is	a	person	who	works,	studies,	goes	home	and	
fixes	things,	and	who	once	a	week	joins	a	group	of	people	he	feels	affini-
ty	with	in	order	to	talk	until	midnight	about	what	he	would	like	to	do	in	
the	future	and	to	plan.	Then	on	Saturday,	he	organizes	an	activity	when	
he	can	or	wants.	(…)	Each	one	enlists	to	work	on	an	issue	and	pushes	it	
forward.	It	does	not	mean	that	he	must	abandon	everything	else.	There	
are	people	who	take	this	as	an	activism;	I	am	not	an	activist.	I	see	it	
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as	a	space	for	participation,	not	for	activism.	Activism	gives	you	a	fra-
mework,	a	structure,	a	hierarchy…	(Male,	4,	unemployed	and	student,	
Asamblea	de	Palermo	Viejo,	with	brief	prior	political	experience)
A	great	proportion	of	the	assembly	members	who	did	not	turn	into	ac-
tivists	deserted	after	a	relatively	brief	time.	The	already	enormous	dif-
ficulties	to	keep	up	with	the	process	were	further	intensified	by	the	fast	
ebb	tide	of	the	initial	wave	of	enthusiasm,	by	the	distance	that	became	
apparent	between	expectations	and	reality,	and	by	the	rapid	transfor-
mation	of	the	political	context	from	which	the	assemblies	had	arisen.
The	recognition	of	the	need	for	professional	politicians	and	pub-
lic	officials	was	also	strengthened	by	the	assemblies’	failures,	consid-
ered	as	such	by	a	vast	majority	of	our	interviewees	–the	few	exceptions	
coming	from	the	members	of	assemblies	that	had	survived	thanks	to	
their	exceptional	dynamism	and	productivity,	but	that	were	also	de-
picted	by	members	of	other	assemblies	as	“partisan”,	“piqueteras”	or	
“state-like”	organizations.	“Assemblies	were	not	effective	at	anything”,	
says	in	a	lapidary	tone	a	former	member	of	the	Asamblea	del	Botánico	
(Male,	4,	with	limited	prior	political	experience).	Most	of	the	deci-
sions	made	were	 simply	not	 implemented.	 “Today	 something	 is	de-
cided	and	when	we	meet	next	we	have	not	done	 it	 and	 if	we	have,	
then	others	come	and	talk	about	it	all	over	and	say	that	it	was	badly	
done.	(…)	There	is	great	stagnation	and	many	reiterations”,	a	former	
member	of	the	Asamblea	Popular	de	Olivos	(Male,	60,	with	previous	
political	experience)	tells	us,	“[The]	things	that	were	done	were	then	
lost,	dissolved.	Everything	was	so	relaxed”,	agrees	a	former	assembly	
member	of	Lanús	(Female,	6,	with	no	previous	political	experience).	
The	explanation	typically	provided	to	account	for	these	difficulties	is	
based	on	the	idea	that	no	organization	functions	when	its	members	
only	do	what	they	want,	because	they	want	to	and	when	they	want	to.	
References	to	the	“lax	organization”,	the	straightforward	“disorgani-
zation”	of	the	assemblies	and	their	character	as	“non-organizations”	
are	indeed	frequently	repeated.	The	“committees”	or	“sub-areas”	that	
the	assemblies	were	 typically	divided	 into	are	described	as	 “affinity	
groups”	where	each	one	worked	“on	what	he/she	 likes”.	Thus,	 “you	
do	absolutely	what	you	feel	like.	And	if	there	is	something	you	don’t	
like,	you	don’t	do	it”,	explains	a	former	assembly	member	from	Núñez	
(Male,	54,	with	prior	political	experience).
Many	interviewees	link	the	decline	and	extinction	of	a	great	part	
of	 the	assemblies	 to	 their	difficulties	 to	get things done.	Conversely,	
there	are	many	who	state	that	the	assemblies	that	still	exist	are	those	
that	have	been	able	to	build	something	valuable	 in	their	 immediate	
context	and	keep	it	going	over	time:	indeed,	they	survive	around	a	Cul-
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tural	Center,	a	soup	kitchen	or	any	other	tangible	achievement	that	is	
“what	allowed	us	to	still	find	a	meaning	in	keeping	meeting”	(Male,	,	
Asamblea	Gastón	Riva,	with	limited	previous	political	experience).
The stance towards the 2003 presidential elections
The	re-arranging	of	 the	political	 scene	and	 the	occurrence	of	presi-
dential	elections	less	than	a	year	and	a	half	after	the	outburst	of	po-
litical	protest	posed	a	difficult	challenge	for	the	assemblies.	Accord-
ing	 to	most	 interviewees,	 assemblies	 did	 not	 establish	 an	 “official”	
position	towards	the	election,	that	is,	no	guidelines	to	be	followed	by	
their	members,	but	instead	they	granted	them	–according	to	the	most	
frequent	 expression–	 “freedom	 of	 action”.	 A	 couple	 of	 interviewees	
say	that	in	their	respective	assemblies	the	issue	“was	almost	not	dis-
cussed”	because	it	was	not	considered	to	be	important;	however,	many	
more	remember	having	taken	part	in	numerous	“chats”,	“discussions”	
and	“debates”	aimed	at	clarifying	what	was	at	stake	and	what	the	dif-
ferent	alternatives	meant	so	that	each	individual	could	find	his	own	
way.	The	following	description	is	thus	typical:
We	talked	a	lot	about	the	elections,	basically	out	of	anguish.	At	a	cer-
tain	point	we	organized	discussions	about	current	events	and	we	ex-
changed	 information	and	views,	we	 reflected	 together.	 It	was	a	 very	
anguishing	situation:	after	all	that	had	happened,	after	the	crisis	and	
everything,	we	did	not	have	anybody	to	vote	for…	(…)	The	idea	was	not	
that	the	assembly	was	going	to	do	this	or	that…	We	talked	about	blank	
voting	and	we	set	out	to	technically	analyze	[its	effects],	a	question	of	
strategy	 (Female,	9,	Asamblea	de	Palermo	Viejo,	with	 limited	prior	
political	experience)
Few	assemblies	called	for	some	specific	stance	or	action	towards	the	
elections,	such	as	abstention	or	casting	blank	or	void	votes.	More	nu-
merous	were	those	that	chose	to	proclaim	the	validity	of	the	QSVT,	
though	 not	 bothering	 to	 make	 it	 clear	 what	 that	 was	 supposed	 to	
mean	in	practical	terms.	Thus,	for	example,	a	member	of	the	Asamb-
lea	de	Castro	Barros	y	Rivadavia	remembers	that	although	“it	did	not	
set	a	position	about	whether	to	go	and	vote”	and	it	decided	“that	each	
one	had	to	do	what	he	wanted”,	his	assembly	“issued	a	ticket	with	the	
slogan	‘Que se vayan todos’. Most	of	us	went	to	vote	with	that	ticket	
and	we	distributed	it	in	the	neighborhood”	(Male,	6,	with	no	previ-
ous	 political	 experience).	 The	Asamblea	 0	 de	Diciembre	 de	Flores	
also	kept	the	slogan,	an	attitude	that	one	of	its	members	describes	as	
“an	elegant	detour	that	helped	avoid	internal	conflicts.	The	assembly	
stood	straight	with	the	ancient	assembly	slogan,	and	those	who	voted	
did	just	what	they	wanted”	(Male,	,	party	activist).
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On	April	7th,	00,	0.5%	of	all	qualified	voters	in	the	country	went	
to	the	polls.	97.%	of	them	cast	a	positive	vote:	void	votes	plummeted	
to	.7%,	and	blank	votes	fell	to	0.99%.	In	the	city	of	Buenos	Aires	per-
centages	were	even	lower:	.4%	and	0.6%,	respectively.	The	presiden-
tial	candidate	of	the	largely	unknown	Confederación para que se vayan 
todos obtained	0.67%	of	the	vote	at	a	national	level	(0.5%	in	the	capital	
city,	and	%	in	the	province	of	Buenos	Aires).	9%	of	the	positive	vote	
was	split	among	five	candidates:	three	of	peronist affiliation	but	with	
divergent	 ideological	 orientations	 (former	 president	 Carlos	Menem,	
with	4.45%;	Néstor	Kirchner,	with	.4%,	and	the	one-week	presi-
dent	Adolfo	Rodríguez	Saá,	with	4.%)	and	two	former	radicals,	one	
located	in	the	center-right	–Ricardo	López	Murphy,	with	6.7%–	and	
another	one	placed	in	the	center-left	of	the	political	spectrum	–Elisa	
Carrió,	with	4.05%	of	the	vote.	The	runoff	election	that	would	have	
decided	the	competition	in	favor	of	one	of	the	two	front-runners,	Men-
em	and	Kirchner,	never	took	place	because	the	former	quit	once	it	was	
clear	that	he	would	suffer	a	massive,	humiliating	defeat.	Thus	Kirchner	
was	proclaimed	the	winner	with	a	magnitude	of	support	that	–it	was	
then	commonly	thought–	would	eventually	cause	him	severe	govern-
ability	problems.	Shortly	after	his	inauguration,	however,	he	surprised	
the	public	with	a	set	of	unexpected	initiatives	that	were	welcomed	by	
the	majority	and	gained	him	the	support	of	a	vast	“virtual	electorate”	
who	assured	that	they	would	have	voted	for	him	had	they	known.	The	
context	of	representation	crisis	had	radically	changed;	thus,	the	very	
soil	in	which	the	assemblies	were	rooted	had	been	transformed.	Born	
out	of	a	mood	that	their	members	now	perceived	as	“capricious”	and	
“superficial”,	with	no	lasting	effects	on	political	culture,	the	assemblies	
were	no	longer	the	citizenry’s	thermometer.
“The	same	people	who	had	participated	in	De	la	Rúa’s	overthrow	
now	went	out	to	vote”,	accuses	a	politically	experienced	member	of	
the	Asamblea	Popular	de	Liniers	(Male,	47).	The	same	accusation	ap-
plies	to	most	of	our	interviewees.	Indeed,	few	voided	their	vote,	and	
although	some	time	before	the	election	the	majority	seemed	inclined	
towards	blank	vote	(or	towards	an	hypothetical	vote	for	Luis	Zamo-
ra,	 whose	 party,	 Autodeterminación y Libertad	 –Self-Determination 
and Freedom– was	not	running),	as	the	date	of	the	election	neared	
they	“dispersed	among	blank	vote,	vote	for	the	left,	vote	for	Kirchner	
or	Carrió…”	(Female,	,	Multisectorial	de	San	Cristóbal,	activist).	
Two	explanations	are	given	to	account	for	that	change.	First	of	all,	
casting	a	blank	vote	was	viewed	as	equal	to	“washing	one’s	hands	of	
the	problem”.	Secondly,	explains	a	former	member	of	the	Asamblea	
del	Botánico,	the	experience	with	municipal	politics	had	produced	
the	certainty	that	politicians	were	not	all	the	same	after	all:
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People	who	[initially]	thought	that	everything	was	the	same	[eventu-
ally]	agreed	that	if	we	hadn’t	had	those	people	[from	Izquierda	Unida]	
in	the	Legislature,	we	would	not	have	been	able	to	do	that	work	(Male,	
4,	with	limited	prior	political	experience)
Divisions	aggravated	soon	after	Néstor	Kirchner’s	inauguration.	Several	
surviving	assemblies,	already	slimmer,	were	put	under	pressure,	suffered	
divisions	or	disintegrated	as	a	result	of	the	disagreements	between	the	
critical	and	the	expectant,	often	settled	with	exit	by	the	latter.	Even	two	
years	later,	an	activist	from	the	Multisectorial	de	San	Cristóbal	acknowl-
edges	that	in	her	assembly	it	is	still	not	advisable	to	discuss	Kirchner’s	
government,	“because	we	 like	each	other	a	 lot	and	we	do	not	want	 to	
kill	each	other”	(Female,	).	Indeed,	many	of	our	interviewees	point	to	
the	expectations	generated	by	the	new	government	as	one	of	the	caus-
es	of	the	assemblies’	decline.	In	particular,	they	underline	that	the	new	
president	“adopted	the	discourse	or	certain	part	of	the	discourse	and	the	
reclamations	expressed	in	00”	(Male,	9,	Asamblea	de	Palermo	Viejo).	
Which	is	disqualified	as	“double	standards”	(Male,	47,	Asamblea	Popu-
lar	de	Liniers)	by	those	who	distrust	the	president’s	intentions	and	be-
lieve	that	“there	is	no	difference”	between	him	and	his	predecessors	or	
electoral	competitors,	because	they	all	executed	or	would	have	executed	
“a	mandate	assigned	by	the	dominant	classes,	that	is,	the	restoration	of	
governability	[and]	of	state	power,	the	fastening	of	exploitation	and	sub-
ordination”	(Male,	54,	Espacio	Asambleario	de	Parque	Patricios).	Others	
recognize	that,	although	Kirchner	is	not	the	same	as,	say,	Carlos	Menem,	
“from	the	point	of	view	of	our	interests	there	is	no	difference”	–while	they	
do	see	a	difference	at	the	municipal	level	where	assemblies	operate,	which	
is	the	reason	why	many	supported	the	president’s	candidate	for	mayor	
against	his	right-wing	challenger.	Last	but	not	least,	there	is	a	third	group	
of	interviewees	who	value	the	new	government’s	human	rights	policies,	
its	stance	towards	the	Supreme	Court	and	its	alleged	severity	against	cor-
ruption.	However,	the	policies	that	are	approved	by	our	interviewees	tend	
to	be	perceived	as	the	result	of	the	actions	undertaken	by	the	citizenry	in	
00	and	by	the	assemblies	in	the	months	that	followed:
It	is	stupid	to	believe	that	[Kirchner]	is	the	same	(…)	He	has	had	ges-
tures	and	signals	that	the	previous	governments	did	not.	What	I	doubt	
is	that	his	signals,	slogans	or	policies	are	really	expressed	out	of	con-
viction.	I	believe	that	 the	process	started	 in	00	deeply	marked	the	
governments	that	followed,	Kirchner’s	in	this	case.	It	seems	to	me	that	
the	specter	of	what	happened	to	the	previous	government	determined,	
maybe	not	a	program,	but	at	least	a	minimum	set	of	measures,	or	of	
discourse,	 to	 be	 embraced	 (Male,	 	 Asamblea	 0	 de	Diciembre	 de	
Flores,	party	activist)
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Deliberation and decision-making
Deliberation and horizontality
Discussion,	reflection	and	deliberation	are	usually	at	the	center	of	the	
definitions	of	“assembly”	given	by	our	interviewees:
An	assembly	is	a	big	interrogation.	It	is	a	questioning	of	many	things	
(…)	A	little	bit	of	free	association	(Male,	9,	Asamblea	de	Palermo	Vie-
jo,	with	no	prior	political	experience)
[The	assembly]	 is	a	space	of	discussion	and	action,	of	discussion	as	
action	 (Male,	,	Asamblea	Gastón	Riva,	with	 limited	prior	political	
experience)
[The	assembly	had]	an	attitude	of	participation,	search,	and	reflection	about	
what	could	be	done	(…)	What	was	new	was	the	fact	that	we	met	to	talk	
about	politics,	that	we	tried	to	change	certain	things	but	without	knowing	
too	well	where	we	were	 leading.	Meeting	 in	order	 to	discuss	without	a	
clear	horizon.	Discussing	politics	without	having	the	ordinary	goals	that	
any	political	organization	has:	obtaining	positions,	reaching	power	(Fema-
le,	6,	ex-Asamblea	de	Lanús,	with	no	prior	political	experience)
The	difference	between	assemblies	and	political	parties	is	systemati-
cally	identified	as	based	on	the	nature	of	the	deliberation	process	that	
takes	place	in	the	former	but	not	in	the	latter:
In	a	party	you	always	have	prior	agreements,	it	is	not	a	place	where	you	
go	and	discuss.	You	basically	know	which	its	political	stance	and	its	
theoretical	assumptions	are.	That	did	not	happen	in	the	assembly	(Fe-
male,	6,	ex-Asamblea	de	Lanús,	with	no	prior	political	experience)
[There	was]	brainstorming.	Nobody	came	and	said	‘this	has	to	be	done’.	
As	I	had	experience	with	activism	in	a	political	party	where	there	was	
always	a	political	head	who	said	what	was	 to	be	done,	 I	 very	much	
liked	the	fact	that	[in	the	assembly]	everything	arose	from	below	start-
ing	with	the	question	‘what	shall	we	do?’	instead	of	‘we	have	to	do	this	
because	the	political	 leadership	says	so’	 (Male,	49,	Asamblea	de	Pal-
ermo	Viejo,	with	vast	prior	political	experience)
If	deliberation	and	decision-making	on	the	basis	of	deliberation	can	
take	 place	within	 the	 assemblies	 it	 is	 precisely	 because	 there	 is	 no	
“political	line”	already	established	by	a	“leadership”,	nor	a	“political	
head”	over	the	plenary	with	decision	and	veto	power.	Only	in	such	a	
situation	can	an	exchange	of	arguments	be	a	genuine	one,	because	
only	then	may	its	participants	allow	themselves	to	be	compelled	by	the	
force	of	the	best	argument	rather	than	by	the	titles	flaunted	by	those	
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who	formulate	them.	In	other	words,	deliberation	requires	horizon-
tality,	which	our	 interviewees	 systematically	 oppose	 to	 the	 “vertical	
structure”	of	political	parties.	Horizontality,	in	turn,	requires	equality	
or,	rather,	a	political	equality	built	within	the	framework	of	the	assem-
bly	–a	“homogeneization	of	places”,	as	somebody	puts	it.	In	the	words	
of	three	former	assembly-members:	
[Within	the	assembly]	all	have	the	same	voice	and	the	same	force.	Doc-
uments	are	produced	that	were	studied	by	everybody.	It	is	possible	to	
achieve	a	situation	where	nobody	believes	 to	be	more	than	anybody	
else	(…)	There	were	people	with	money,	but	within	the	assembly	we	
were	all	equal	(Female,	ex-Asamblea	de	Olivos,	with	political	experi-
ence	and	party	affiliation)
Hierarchies	had	no	weight,	we	all	discussed	as	equals.	It	was	fine	to	
get	rid	of	the	idea	that	because	he	has	a	degree,	the	scientist	is	the	one	
who	knows.	There	was	no	social	division	in	that	sense	(Female,	6,	ex-
Asamblea	de	Lanús,	with	no	previous	political	experience)
We	are	used	to	the	fact	that	decisions	are	always	made	by	somebody	
else.	In	any	place	where	you	are,	you	delegate	or	somebody	represents	
you,	 there	are	always	authorities	and	hierarchic	 levels.	 (…)	 [The	as-
sembly]	is	a	complete	utopia.	I	do	not	know	anything	about	politics,	
nothing	at	all,	and	I	am	here	talking	to	this	guy	who	has	been	an	activ-
ist	for	thirty	years	and	in	order	to	decide	whether	to	go	to	a	demonstra-
tion	what	I	think	is	as	valid	as	what	he	thinks	(Female,	,	ex-Asamblea	
de	Lanús	Centro,	with	brief	prior	political	and	partisan	experience)
What	resulted	from	equality	among	the	diverse	was	the	possibility	“to	
build	your	own	thought	on	the	basis	of	different	thoughts”	(Female,	
44,	ex-Asamblea	de	Palermo	Viejo,	without	prior	political	experience)	
–or,	as	a	current	member	of	the	same	assembly	puts	it:
You	listen	to	what	the	other	thinks	and	you	modify	what	you	are	think-
ing.	I	ask	for	the	floor,	I	am	on	the	list	of	speakers	and	while	the	mo-
ment	 for	me	to	speak	approaches,	 I	keep	changing,	adding	 things	 to	
what	 I	 originally	 thought,	 sometimes	 up	 to	 the	 point	 of	 completely	
transforming	what	I	was	thinking	because	I	happened	to	listen	to	a	rea-
soning	which	seemed	good	to	me,	or	because	somebody	else	saw	things	
that	I	had	not	even	thought	about	before.	That	is	what	I	like	and	what	
impresses	me	most	about	the	assembly:	this	collective	construction	of	
what	is	being	thought	(Male,	9,	with	no	prior	political	experience)
assemblies are therefore ideally thought of as a space where politics is no 
longer monopolized by experts but recovered by and for citizens. according to 
a member of the asamblea de palermo Viejo, participants in assembly debates 
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are “people” or “citizens”, not “specialists”; if that were not the case, “a citizen 
would be like the dentist’s patient, who cannot say anything; the only thing he 
can do is keep his mouth open and abstain from complaining if it hurts” (male, 
48, with prior political and partisan experience).
assembly discussions encompassed subjects as diverse as imaginable, at 
the most varied levels of abstraction and generality. “from growing vegetables 
in a communitarian garden to the socialist revolution, supporting iraq’s or af-
ghanistan’s struggle… it was very eclectic, very strange” (male, 36, asamblea 
de castro barros y rivadavia, with no previous political experience). Debate 
took place about “the country’s problems, the problems of the economy, health 
and education policies, the situation of the political regime” (male, 47, asamblea 
popular de liniers, with long prior political activism), as well as about how to 
undertake a certain task or how to express solidarity with the neighborhood’s car-
toneros7, or about attendance to the following mobilization or to the Asamblea 
Interbarrial, or on the content of a flyer to be printed so as to let neighbors know 
about an activity organized or a stance taken by the assembly.
The level of abstraction of debates was itself turned into a subject for discus-
sion within assemblies, as well as into the object of accusations and misunder-
standings among them. indeed, some assemblies were regularly criticized for their 
alleged “elitist”, “theorizing” and “pseudo-intellectual” tendencies. Whereas some 
assemblies devoted most time to the discussion of “everyday issues”, “problems of 
the neighborhood” and “real needs”, explains a member of the asamblea popular 
de pompeya, others “discussed the law of gravitation” (male, 57, with long prior 
political experience). The accusation is denied by some members of the criticized 
assemblies, whereas others acknowledge that the “high intellectual level” of their 
assemblies, where “very interesting and rich debates took place” (in contrast to those 
“with a shallower composition and a much simpler language”) eventually produced 
tensions, splits and desertions. This effect attributed to “professional knowledge” is 
in other cases equally blamed on the prevalence of “activist knowledge”.
similar discussions took place about the level at which activities were to be 
undertaken, that is, about whether “to work within the neighborhood or at a more 
general level” (nevertheless, in many cases the solution was found in the organi-
zation of committees where “each one could work on what he wanted”. The de-
bate about the scope to be conferred to assemblies’ actions was frequently shaped 
as a confrontation between “common neighbors” and “revolutionary activists”. 
Thus, for example, when the asamblea 20 de Diciembre from parque avellaneda 
discussed the position to adopt in response to the decline of the cacerolazos, “the 
orthodox leftist sectors [that] considered that the situation was ripe for an at-
tack against central power strongly opposed any kind of work at the local level” 
(male, 41, with union experience).
7	 	The	term	is	applied	to	the	unemployed	who	make	a	living	from	collecting	cardboard	
and	paper	from	trash	bags	in	the	streets	and	selling	them	to	recycling	companies.
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assembly meetings are usually described as “chaotic”. “it was almost im-
possible to fix an agenda, not to talk about following it”, states a former member 
of the asamblea de núñez (male, 54, with previous political experience). it is 
frequently underscored by activists turned into assembly members as well as by 
assembly members turned into activists that in those conditions it was impossible 
to run a true “political discussion”:
[After	practical	issues	were	addressed]	there	was	no	time	left	for	dis-
cussion.	There	were	so	many	activities	 that	 it	was	soon	midnight,		
a.m.	and	nothing	had	been	discussed.	So	another	space	was	created	
where	it	would	be	possible	to	discuss	a	little	more.	We	were	few,	just	
the	activists	and	some	neighbors	(…)	[Since	then]	the	plenary	assem-
bly	started	to	be	very	organized	and	expeditious	(Male,	,	Asamblea	
0	de	Diciembre	de	Flores,	party	activist)
Thus, it was not long before “official” opportunities for political discussion 
were confined to special events –typically, all-day weekend activities organized 
around the presentation and discussion of some specific subject– and to special-
ized committees (“committee for political analysis”, “discussion workshop”, 
“debate group”) aimed at “synthesizing” and “raising issues” that were to be later 
introduced into the plenary assembly. This notwithstanding, substantial debates 
continued to take place in assemblies all the time, usually triggered by practical 
issues. “everything in the assembly led to political discussion”, states a member 
of the asamblea de castro barros y rivadavia. “from setting up a soup kitchen 
to whether or not to distribute food packets” (male, 36, with no prior political 
experience). according to an activist from flores, heated discussions about the 
legitimacy of private property took place there when the possibility was consid-
ered of seizing an unoccupied estate as the cold weather made it impossible to 
continue meeting outdoors. in other assemblies, social issues and policies, gov-
ernmental handouts and social rights were thoroughly discussed each time prob-
lems arose related to the organization of the assembly’s solidarity undertakings. 
last but not least, as a result of its unprecedented character assemblies displayed 
still another noteworthy trait: that of hosting a score of self-reflective practices, 
including constant discussion about what an assembly was and should be and 
what their horizontal practices were about.
Vote or Consensus
a widely discussed issue was that of the decision-making procedures that were more 
compatible with –and more conducive to– horizontality. Two of them are mentioned 
	 	At	the	same	time	it	was	considered	to	be	unadvisable	to	introduce	deep	politi-
cal	discussions	in	plenary	meetings,	as	they	would	probably	chase	away	those	who	
considered	themselves	to	be	“plain	neighbors”,	interested	in	“getting	things	done”	but	
reluctant	to	“discuss	politics”.
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by equally numerous groups of interviewees as the form adopted by decision-mak-
ing in their own assemblies: the holding of a vote and the search for consensus.
Whereas some people assume that decision by majority vote is the “natural” 
decision-making process due to its “obviously” democratic character, others say 
that their assemblies only embraced it at the beginning and just for quantitative 
reasons, or as a last resource when consensus was impossible to reach due either 
to special circumstances, or to the peculiarity of the issue under discussion, but 
that it was abandoned as soon as assemblies shrank due to desertions or when 
splits increased their homogeneity9. it is for the very same reasons that some in-
terviewees state that while the search for consensus was the usual practice within 
committees, decisions in plenary meetings were made by means of a vote by 
show of hands. others, however, express their preference for consensus on the 
claim that its effects were less divisive, and out of the conviction that “more 
people will follow a decision made by the whole” (male, 36, asamblea de castro 
barros y rivadavia, with no previous political experience).
both those that vindicate voting and those who prefer consensus (frequently 
identified with harmony, especially by those with little political experience) do it 
out of the conviction that the procedure of their choice is the most “horizontal” 
and “democratic” one. at the same time, criticisms directed both to voting and 
to consensus (and especially to the latter, often described as “more original” and 
“more difficult” to practice) are centered on two issues: their democratic defi-
ciencies and their operational limitations. “i am not going to tell you that [con-
sensus] is that democratic (…) people who disagreed on something left”, says a 
member of the multisectorial de san cristóbal (female, 31 years, party activist). 
“Those who are used to activism do not find any trouble in debating [in search 
for consensus]. but there are other neighbors who are not used to it”, points out 
a former member of the asamblea de olivos (male, 60, with political experience 
and party affiliation), implicitly maintaining that regarding voting, by contrast, 
everybody stands on an equal footing. in any case, both discussion in the search 
for consensus and voting as a way of settling a discussion are admittedly subject 
to manipulation and “aparateadas” –that is, to the intervention of party activists 
able to distort them and twist them in their favor:
9	 	Quantity	and	heterogeneity	were	usually	celebrated	but	at	this	point	they	tend	
to	be	recognized	as	highly	problematic.	“At	the	beginning	it	was	completely	crazy.	
Eighty	thousand	proposals	were	thrown	and	then	they	were	voted	by	show	of	hands.	
Anybody	who	happened	to	be	around	joined	and	raised	their	hand,	it	was	meaning-
less”,	confesses	a	 former	member	of	 the	Asamblea	del	Botánico.	 “It	 took	soooooo	
long	 until	 each	 committee	 submitted	 all	 its	 weekly	 activities	 for	 voting	 that	 they	
ended	up	being	voted	by	ten	people”,	recalls	another	one	from	Flores	Sur.	“It	was	a	
never-ending	story.	Sometimes	it	was	half	past	one	in	the	morning	and	we	were	in	the	
park	since	eight	(…)	Then	the	cold	weather	started	and	we	had	to	set	limits	to	hori-
zontality	and	be	more	expedite”,	agrees	a	member	of	the	Asamblea	0	de	Diciembre	
de	Flores.	The	vast	majority	therefore	agree	on	that	“it	was	possible	to	work	better	
when	there	were	less	people”,	as	an	assembly	member	from	Almagro	puts	it.
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At	the	outset	everything	was	subject	to	vote	because	activists	from	politi-
cal	parties	are	very	used	to	voting;	it	is	a	way	to	impose	their	views	(Male,	
49,	Asamblea	de	Palermo	Viejo,	with	previous	political	experience)
[The	search	for	consensus]	can	be	useful	to	soften	difficult	situations.	
But	there	are	moments	when	I	prefer	a	vote.	Because	in	the	search	for	
consensus	you	can	get	to	constantly	introduce	your	views	(Male,	4,	
Asamblea	de	Palermo	Viejo,	with	previous	partisan	experience)
Very	heated	discussions	[took	place]	that	ended	up	with	a	vote	that	did	
not	settle	the	question	(…)	Losing	an	election	was	not	easily	accepted	
so	 the	 losers	manipulated	 the	whole	 thing	 in	 order	 to	 twist	 it	 from	
within.	There	was	a	certain	resistance	to	accepting	the	decision	of	the	
majority	(Male,	47,	Asamblea	0	de	Diciembre	de	Flores,	with	previous	
political	and	union	experience)
At	 voting	 time,	when	everything	was	almost	over,	 discussion	 erupt-
ed.	(…)	There	were	three	stages:	first,	proposals;	later,	debate	of	pro-
posals,	and	nobody	discussed.	And	when	voting	time	arrived…	blah	
blah	blah.	We	who	had	no	experience	were	a	ping-pong	ball.	There	
were	 the	MST	 (Movimiento	Socialista	de	 los	Trabajadores)	 and	 the	
PO	(Partido	Obrero).And	the	discussion	was	the	ball,	which	bounced	
back	and	forth…	You	felt	like	you	had	arrived	at	the	cinema	to	watch	
a	film	that	had	already	started.	Those	were	really	old	debates	and	you	
didn’t	get	a	thing	(Female,	6,	ex-Asamblea	de	Lanús,	with	no	prior	
political	experience)
Along with the deficiencies of both mechanisms in terms of democratic quality, 
also the quality of the resulting decisions is put into question. The consensual 
practice is the preferred target for the second type of criticisms. Whereas some 
consider as an unavoidable side effect the fact that proposals on which agree-
ment cannot be reached are left aside so as to avoid conflict, others take it as a 
severe structural problem located at the root of assemblies’ lack of agility and ef-
ficacy. The latter is the stance taken by several interviewees who repeatedly point 
out that through consensus “very few” or “too obvious” things could be decided 
–things such as going out and protest against the presence in the neighborhood 
of a former dictatorship’s public official or to attend a demonstration on the an-
niversary of the 1976 military coup. but decisions reached through consensus 
on more controversial issues were “liquified”; that is the reason why a vote was 
resorted to “when the issue deserved it”. “The search for consensus”, explains a 
former member of the asamblea de núñez, “is like a polishing process that goes 
on until the thing is totally blunt and does not cut anymore”. in addition, it is “not 
very operational”: “there is maybe one person in disagreement and you spend 
five hours braining yourself to approach positions with whatever the guy thinks” 
(male, 54, with previous political experience). several interviewees also add the 
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inconvenience that decisions thus made do not leave anybody happy, so they do 
not prompt enough commitment at the time of implementation.
The most radical criticism against the assembly format, though, is that which 
contests both decision-making mechanisms on the basis of the ascertainment of 
a link between emergency, decision and leadership. in the words of a former as-
sembly member from olivos:
You	cannot	live	in	a	permanent	state	of	assembly.	(…)	Some	decisions	
have	to	be	urgently	made,	there	must	be	some	representation,	a	small	
committee	 to	make	urgent	decisions.	Horizontality	 is	fine,	but	 there	
are	decisions	that	have	to	be	made	by	somebody.	(…)	In	an	emergency	
you	cannot	summon	a	general	assembly	(Male,	60,	with	partisan	ex-
perience)
The arising of leaderships
Horizontality	was	not	 just	 a	 practice	 but	 also	 an	 aim	 that	was	 “al-
most	obsessively”	pursued.	“Everything	was	democratically	decided”,	
explains	 an	 interviewee.	 “Each	 time	 it	was	 also	decided	how	a	 cer-
tain	 issue	was	to	be	decided”	(Male,	50,	activist).	For	many	present	
and	past	assembly	members,	however,	horizontality	was	not	a	full	fact	
but	mostly	a	regulatory	ideal,	a	horizon	that	kept	moving	away.	Con-
sequently,	many	insist	that,	although	there	were	no	“titles”	or	“hier-
archies”	 in	the	assemblies,	 there	were	 indeed	“people	with	different	
interests”,	with	different	“histories”,	“careers”,	“training”	or	“person-
alities”,	all	of	which	established	clear	differences	among	them.	These	
were	not	expressed	in	terms	of	the	right	to	speak	(which	was	in	prin-
ciple	accessible	to	all),	but	in	terms	of	the	extent	to	which	each	one’s	
words	were	taken	into	account.	“Proposals”,	states	a	member	of	the	
Asamblea	0	de	Diciembre	de	Flores,	“had	a	different	weight	accord-
ing	to	who	said	them”	(Male,	4,	with	previous	political	experience).
Few	consider	that	the	sprouting	of	this	kind	of	differences	could	
have	 been	 avoided;	 the	 majority	 considers	 it	 instead	 as	 a	 natural	
process	 as	 they	 acknowledge	 the	 presence	 of	 “natural	 hierarchies”,	
“spontaneous	leaderships”	and	“natural-born	leaders”.	“All	processes	
yield	leaders”,	says	a	politically	experienced	member	of	the	Asamblea	
Popular	de	Liniers.	“Who	is	the	one	who	says	‘let’s	do	this’?	There	are	
always	leaders,	natural	commanders”	(Male,	47).
Since	what	is	at	stake	is	the	differential	of	attention	given	to	the	
word	of	some	above	that	of	others	within	a	space	characterized,	above	
all,	by	the	production	of	discourse,	it	is	only	natural	that	those	who	
are	considered	to	be	“points	of	reference”	are	in	the	first	place	those	
who	“know	how	to	speak”,	have	 “rhetorical	abilities”,	 show	“a	high	
cultural	level”	or	bring	in	some	useful	knowledge	on	a	relevant	field.	
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Those	who	fit	that	description	were	usually	professionals	and	intellec-
tuals	who	“could	easily	occupy	all	the	space	with	their	ideas”;	in	other	
assemblies,	however,	the	role	was	played	by	people	with	a	“history	of	
activism”	or	“party	experience”	 thanks	 to	which	“they	knew	how	to	
handle	situations”	(Male,	4,	ex-Asamblea	del	Botánico,	with	previous	
political	experience).	In	either	case,	the	effect	caused	disappointment	
with	the	alleged	pedagogical	virtues	of	debate:
[At	the	beginning	we	thought]	‘fine,	we	have	people	who	did	not	finish	
elementary	school	and	who	join	because	they	want	security,	they	want	
their	children	to	be	able	to	safely	go	through	the	park,	and	at	the	same	
time	we	have	a	psychologist,	an	economist,	people	with	previous	po-
litical	participation.	Our	discussions	are	going	to	oscillate	and	we	are	
going	to	grow	up	together.	The	lady	who	is	worried	that	their	children	
can	walk	through	the	park	is	going	to	learn	from	the	other	one,	and	
the	latter	is	going	to	learn	from	her’.	I	thought	that	was	going	to	yield	a	
change.	But	no,	the	neighbor	simply	left	(…)	People	who	came	as	plain	
neighbors,	without	much	of	an	intellect,	had	to	give	way	to	those	who	
knew,	because	those	who	knew	were	the	visionaries	(Female,	55,	ex-
Asamblea	de	Monserrat,	with	previous	political	experience)
Leaderships	were	built	not	just	on	the	abovementioned	resources,	all	
of	which	existed	prior	to	and	independently	from	the	assembly	experi-
ence.	They	were	also	fed	by	other	resources	accumulated	on	the	spot.	
Thus,	 for	 example,	 the	 authority	 recognized	 to	 the	 “old	 guard”,	 that	
is	to	say,	to	“the	comrades	who	formed	the	assembly,	who	worked	for	
its	construction”	(Male,	4,	Asamblea	0	de	Diciembre	de	Flores,	with	
previous	political	 experience)	 and	 to	 “those	who	are	 always	 there	 to	
organize”	(Male,	57,	Asamblea	Popular	de	Pompeya,	with	vast	political	
experience),	individuals	who	“after	two	or	three	years	have	become	ac-
tivists”	(Male,	,	Asamblea	0	de	Diciembre	de	Flores,	party	activist).	
Indeed,	many	interviewees	establish	a	link	between	leadership	and	the	
burden	of	responsibility.	“We	changed	towards	a	more	organic	structure	
based	on	degrees	of	responsibility”,	explains	our	assembly	member.	“It	
is	not	the	same	when	a	comrade	speaks	who	works	there	all	day	and	
becomes	a	point	of	reference,	than	when	somebody	else	speaks”,	ratifies	
an	activist	from	the	Multisectorial	de	San	Cristóbal	(Female,	).
For	many	of	our	interviewees,	the	sprouting	of	leaderships	with	
some	 decision	 power	 amounts	 to	 the	 definite	 loss	 of	 horizontality.	
According	to	others,	however,	horizontality	 is	able	 to	survive,	albeit	
under	a	modified	 form.	The	 latter	provide	at	 least	 three	arguments	
to	support	their	position.	First	of	all,	the	fact	that	leaderships	arose	
spontaneously	and	leaders	were	not	appointed	nor	had	a	position	to	
which	to	cling	or	 from	which	to	behave	as	“official	representatives”	
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continued	to	establish	a	great	difference	between	assemblies	and	es-
tablished	 political	 institutions.	 In	 the	 former,	 but	 not	 in	 the	 latter,	
compliance	was	 voluntary	 and	 leaderships	 needed	 to	 be	 constantly	
subject	 to	plebiscite,	 so	 to	 speak.	 “There	were	natural	 leaderships”,	
recognizes	a	member	of	the	Asamblea	de	Castro	Barros	y	Rivadavia,	
“but	not	a	leader	that	had	to	be	obeyed”	(Male,	6,	without	previous	
political	experience).	Secondly,	as	the	existence	of	leaders	was	often	
severely	questioned,	ways	were	found	to	limit	its	effects	by	means	of	
devices	such	as	rotation,	the	separation	of	functions	by	areas,	and	the	
collective	exercise	of	responsibilities.	In	the	third	place,	our	interview-
ees	remind	us	that	only	“operational	decisions”	and	“execution”	were	
carried	out	vertically	and	by	small	groups.	“Fundamental	decisions”,	
by	contrast,	kept	coming	from	plenary	meetings.	That	is,	even	though	
horizontality	was	not	“complete”	and	equality	was	no	 longer	“abso-
lute”,	there	still	existed	a	place	where	“everybody,	from	the	one	with	
the	 biggest	 responsibilities	 to	 the	 one	 who	 participates	 less”	 could	
discuss	on	an	equal	footing.	“Management	requires	different	degrees	
of	 responsibility	 but	 even	 so	 the	 assembly	 spirit	 remains	 and	 deci-
sions	are	made	by	everybody”	(Male,	,	Asamblea	0	de	Diciembre	de	
Flores,	party	activist).	Once	this	point	reached,	nevertheless,	the	ap-
preciation	for	the	previously	cherished	principle	of	horizontality	had	
declined	from	the	perspective	of	assembly	activists,	now	a	majority	in	
the	thinned	assemblies	that	still	remained:
[At	the	beginning]	everybody	was	worth	a	vote;	[it	was]	too	horizontal,	
too	democratic	because	people	who	actively	participated	were	worth	the	
same	as	those	who	just	came	and	listened	once	a	week	(Male,	4,	Asamb-
lea	0	de	Diciembre	de	Flores,	with	previous	political	experience)
Participation in the Assembly of assemblies:
Representatives or delegates?
In	mid-January,	00	 the	assemblies	 recently	 formed	 in	Buenos	Ai-
res	started	to	meet	each	Sunday	in	Parque	Centenario	so	as	to	share	
and	coordinate	their	various	activities.	Although	at	the	beginning	for	
many	people	it	embodied	a	“utopia”	and	a	“dream	turned	into	reality”,	
the	Interbarrial	was	soon	the	stage	for	severe	and	even	violent	disa-
greements	on	the	ideas	of	deliberation,	representation	and	the	links	
between	them.
	 The	“manipulation”	and	“maneuvers”	staged	by	leftist	politi-
cal	parties	in	the	Interbarrial	have	been	widely	and	largely	criticized.	
What	 interests	 us	 here	 is	 the	 charge	 that	 true	 deliberation	was	 ab-
sent	 from	 it	 due	 to	 partisan	 interferences.	 Several	 interviewees	 tell	
that	 parties	 “came	 with	 their	 party	 programs	 and	 discussed	 them	
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with	others	who	had	another	party	program.	(…)	And	unfortunately	
what	happened	was	what	usually	happens	in	trade	union	assemblies:	
the	 vote	 took	 place	 at	 the	 last	minute,	when	 three	 quarters	 [of	 the	
participants]	 had	 already	 left”	 (Female,	 49,	 ex-Asamblea	 de	 Parque	
Chacabuco,	with	previous	political	experience).	“You	went	there	as	an	
independent	assembly	member	and	you	quickly	found	out	that	there	
were	prior	alignments,	which	was	not	supposed	to	be	the	rule	of	the	
game”	(Male,	54,	ex-Asamblea	de	Núñez,	with	previous	political	expe-
rience).
Party	behavior	is	also	held	responsible	for	the	excessive	distance	
that	soon	became	apparent	between	discussions	and	reality.	On	one	
hand,	“discussions	in	Parque	Centenario	had	nothing	to	do	with	what	
was	discussed	in	the	assembly”,	points	out	a	member	of	the	Asamblea	
0	de	Diciembre	de	Flores	(Male,	4,	with	previous	political	experien-
ce);	on	the	other	hand,	“lots	of	politics	was	discussed	that	was	comple-
tely	unrelated	to	social	processes.	(…)	Twenty-two	mobilizations	were	
voted	for	a	single	week.	Twenty-two!	And	nobody	attended”,	explains	
a	member	 of	 the	Asamblea	 de	 San	Telmo	 (Male,	 5).	 According	 to	
several	interviewees,	the	problem	was	that	leftist	parties	“arrived	with	
their	handbooks”	and	“interpreted	what	was	happening	on	the	basis	
of	them”	(Male,	9,	Asamblea	de	Palermo	Viejo,	with	no	prior	political	
experience).	Therefore	the	circulation	of	slogans	such	as	“All	power	to	
the	assemblies”,	exposed	by	a	former	member	of	the	same	assembly	as	
an	example	of	the	tendency	“to	bring	categories	and	experiences	from	
other	places”	(Female,	,	with	limited	prior	political	experience).
Interferences	 of	 parties	were	 real,	 and	 parties	were	 indeed	 res-
ponsible	 for	 the	 scandalous	 ending	of	 the	 Interbarrial meetings.	Ne-
vertheless,	their	behavior	was	contingent.	How	different	would	things	
have	been	 if	 those	 interferences	had	not	 taken	place?	This	question	
is	implicitly	addressed	by	those	who	criticize	the	very	existence	of	an	
“assembly	of	assemblies”,	a	structure	of	second	degree	in	which	each	
assembly	participates	by	means	of	the	appointment	of	representatives	
or	delegates0.	“It	was	agreed	on	sending	a	representative.	(…)	Then	we	
had	five	people	voting	on	something	and	expecting	compliance	with	
it”,	says	a	former	member	of	the	Asamblea	de	Flores	Sur	(Female,	6,	
with	 limited	prior	political	experience).	 “This	 relapse	on	representa-
0	 	Dictionary	definitions	 for	both	 terms	are	 similar	and	 include	 reciprocal	 refer-
ences;	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 both	 terms	 are	 often	 used	 interchangeably	 by	 our	 inter-
viewees.	However,	 the	description	that	they	provide	for	the	task	entrusted	to	their	
“representatives”	or	“delegates”	in	the	Interbarrial	fits	the	concept	of	delegation	as	it	
has	been	shaped	by	political	theory.	In	that	sense,	unlike	representatives	within	the	
framework	of	representative	systems,	delegates	are	bound	by	an	imperative	mandate,	
are	instantly	removable	and	perform	for	brief	and	rotating	terms.
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tion	put	 into	question	everything	we	were	 looking	 for	 in	 the	assem-
blies”,	explains	a	member	of	the	Asamblea	de	Palermo	Viejo.	That	is	
the	reason	why	representatives	were	mostly	conceived	of	as	delegates.	
In	the	first	place,	they	were	subject	to	precise	instructions	(“in	writing,	
[because]	there	was	so	much	distrust”,	recalls	a	politically	experienced	
assembly	member	from	Liniers).	“It	had	been	decided	that	they	should	
carry	a	mandate	and	had	to	vote	on	what	each	assembly	had	already	
discussed”	 (Male,	 9,	 Asamblea	 de	 Palermo	Viejo,	with	 no	 previous	
political	experience).	Delegates’	functions	were	consequently	limited	to	
conveying	the	positions	of	their	respective	assemblies.
Secondly,	delegate	rotation	 is	often	emphasized.	Every	week	“it	
was	voted	on	who	would	represent	the	assembly	and	what	they	had	
to	say.	They	rotated”,	explains	a	member	of	the	Asamblea	0	de	Di-
ciembre	de	Flores	(Male,	,	party	activist).	Rotation	is	here	unders-
tood	as	a	mechanism	 to	avoid	 specialization;	as	a	 former	assembly	
member	from	Lanús	Centro	puts	it,	it	was	“a	form	of	[avoiding	that]	
people	were	 type-cast	according	 to	 the	duties	 they	perform”	and	of	
preventing	the	concentration	of	power	that	results	from	“always	doing	
the	 same	 things	 and	monopolizing	 certain	 roles”	 (Female,	 ,	with	
brief	prior	political	experience).	Finally,	the	revocability	of	delegates	
is	also	mentioned.	“For	example”,	recalls	 the	above-quoted	member	
of	the	Asamblea	0	de	Diciembre	de	Flores,	“one	of	them	said	some	
things	that	had	not	been	voted	on	nor	discussed,	and	he	could	not	go	
any	longer”	(Male,	,	party	activist).
However,	 things	were	 not	 as	 easy	 in	 practice.	Most	 assemblies	
(those	that	were	not	under	the	dominion	of	activists	from	some	party)	
proclaimed	themselves	“sovereign”	and	insisted	that	delegates	should	
stick	to	the	limited	functions	already	described.	But	that	“was	not	what	
parties	wanted,	because	 they	mobilized	 their	 apparatus	on	Sunday,	
they	raised	their	hands	and	that	was	it”,	explains	an	assembly	member	
from	Palermo	Viejo,	a	“common	neighbor”	with	no	previous	political	
experience	(Male,	9).	“The	PO	wanted	an	assembly	subordinated	to	
the	decisions	made	in	Parque	Centenario	while	the	vast	majority	of	us	
thought	it	was	a	sovereign	assembly”	(Male,	54,	Espacio	Asambleario	
de	Parque	Patricios,	with	previous	political	experience).
The	underlying	conflict	ran	deeper	than	what	is	made	apparent	in	
the	obvious	attempts	by	leftist	parties	to	“take	control”	of	the	assem-
bly	movement	by	conferring	a	certain	direction	and	a	precise	content	
to	its	actions.	Indeed,	if	the	Interbarrial	had	functioned	according	to	
	This	element	 is	also	questioned	by	some	activists	for	whom	their	“total	 lack	of	
structure”	is	what	prevented	the	assemblies	to	replace	citizenship	participation	when	
the	general	level	of	activity	began	to	decline.
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its	own	principles	–that	is	to	say,	if	its	activities	had	not	undergone	the	
stress	caused	by	party	activism–	the	problem	would	have	presented	
itself	in	terms	of	the	possibilities	for	deliberation	in	a	system	of	de-
legation	based	on	imperative	mandate.	Numerous	interviewees	state	
that	deliberation	in	Parque	Centenario	was	hindered	by	the	presence	
of	activists	who	came	with	their	slogans	and	their	decisions	made	so-
mewhere	else	and	tried	to	impose	them	on	the	rest.	Nevertheless,	if	
that	had	not	happened	and	the	Interbarrial	had	remained	faithful	to	
the	concept	of	representation	as	delegation,	it	would	have	neverthe-
less	been	unable	to	become	a	space	for	deliberation	but,	at	the	most,	a	
space	for	the	exchange	of	experiences	and	for	the	presentation	of	pro-
posals	for	coordination	that	would	have	to	be	sent	to	the	assemblies	in	
the	neighborhoods	and	come	back	with	an	affirmative	or	negative	vote	
a	week	later.	In	other	words,	a	representative	can	only	deliberate	fre-
ely	if	he	is	allowed	to	change	his	mind	when	feeling	compelled	by	an	
argument	better	than	his	own,	which	cannot	happen	(simply	because	
the	rules	prohibit	it)	where	representatives	are	subject	to	precise	ins-
tructions	from	their	principals.
Conclusions
Contrary	to	what	is	usually	expected,	the	crisis	of	representation	–ty-
pically	linked	to	decades	of	governmental	low	performance	and/or	bad	
behavior–	did	not	lead	in	our	case	to	a	rise	in	authoritarian	preferen-
ces	among	the	citizenry	but	to	a	surge	of	deeply	democratic	impulses,	
based	on	the	understanding	–as	quoted	by	one	of	our	interviewees–	
that	“the	cure	for	the	evils	of	democracy	is	more	democracy”.	Indeed,	
most	of	our	interviewees	either	celebrate	the	existence	of	elections	as	
a	necessary	condition	for	democracy,	or	they	simply	take	it	for	gran-
ted.	Most,	if	not	all	of	them,	moreover,	explicitly	state	that	elections	
are	by	no	means	sufficient	as	far	as	the	quality	of	democracy	is	con-
cerned.	Thus,	the	process	described	as	well	as	its	participants’	state	of	
mind	need	to	be	apprehended	in	relation	to	the	issue	of	the	quality	of	
democracy	rather	than	to	that	of	its	consolidation.	In	other	words,	the	
question	that	is	once	and	again	put	forward	is	not	whether	or	for	how	
long	democracy	will	last	in	Argentina,	but	what	kind	of	democracy	is	
the	one	that	we	already	have	and	whether	we	like	it	and	intend	to	keep	
it	that	way	or,	instead,	prefer	to	change	it	for	the	better.
As	has	been	shown,	all	possible	attitudes	towards	the	system	of	
representation	are	present	among	assembly	members,	not	necessarily	
under	 the	 form	of	 consistent	 alternatives,	 and	 in	 various	 combina-
tions.	Among	them	can	be	mentioned	the	rejection	of	the	separation	
between	 the	 represented	 and	 their	 representatives;	 the	 rejection	 of	
the	existing	representative	bond	or	of	the	“political	class”	as	shaped	
117
Inés M. Pousadela
within	the	framework	of	a	“delegative	democracy”;	and	the	rehabili-
tation	of	the	imperative	mandate	and	therefore	of	direct	democracy.	
While	according	to	some	interviewees	 the	QSVT	translated	 into	 the	
reclamation	of	the	end	of	representation	and	the	establishment	of	a	
system	of	direct	and/or	participative	democracy,	according	to	others	
the	realization	of	the	slogan	encompassed	the	revocation	of	all	repre-
sentatives’	terms	and	the	call	for	general	elections	so	as	to	achieve	a	
total	renovation	of	the	“political	class”;	last	but	not	least,	a	third	group	
rejected	the	literal	understanding	of	the	motto	(or	accepted	it	as	such	
only	when	applied	in	a	restricted	way,	such	as	in	the	demand	for	the	
resignation	of	all	Supreme	Court	Justices)	but	happily	embraced	its	
potential	for	the	inclusion	of	the	most	diverse	reclamations	under	an	
umbrella	of	creative	provocation.
Consequently,	 the	 role	 and	meaning	 of	 the	 assemblies	 are	 also	
interpreted	in	various	ways.	Some	think	of	them	as	“an	instrument	for	
a	direct,	non-delegative	democracy”.	“Direct	democracy”,	 in	turn,	 is	
sometimes	differentiated	from	“participative	democracy”	in	that	the	
former	would	require	a	much	greater	involvement	of	the	citizenry	in	
the	decision-making	process.	Thus,	several	interviewees	refer	to	“di-
rect	democracy”	as	the	main	aim	to	achieve	while	they	cling	to	“parti-
cipative	democracy”	as	a	second-best	alternative	in	case	the	preferable	
one	was	not	 achievable.	 In	 other	 cases,	 “participative”	 and	 “direct”	
democracy	are	used	as	interchangeable	expressions	that	refer	to	the	
same	object	 –the	practice	of	direct	democracy–	which	 some	people	
consider	now	to	be	“possible”	due	to	the	existence	of	“the	technology	
to	know	what	people	want”,	at	least	at	the	local	level.
For	 some	 assembly	members,	 assemblies	 embodied	 a	 “political	
alternative”,	 either	 “to	 administer	 or	 to	 control	 the	 administration”.	
In	the	former	sense,	in	particular,	the	experience	tends	to	be	conside-
red	as	a	failure.	Others,	on	the	contrary,	maintain	that	“the	assemblies	
did	not	need	to	be	an	alternative	political	direction	because	they	never	
intended	to	(…)	Because	they	were	born	as	something	different,	as	a	
place	for	rebellion	and	for	a	democratic	practice	of	a	different	natu-
re”	(Male,	54,	Espacio	Asambleario	de	Parque	Patricios,	with	previous	
political	experience).	In	any	case,	even	those	who	apprehend	them	in	
those	terms	feel	sorry	that	those	impulses	and	practices	could	not	be	
institutionalized	and	thus	kept	alive.
From	another	perspective,	assemblies	are	not	understood	as	en-
compassing	an	alternative,	full-blown	system	but	just	as	a	mechanism	
capable	of	functioning	within	the	existing	representative	democracies	
with	 the	aim	of	making	 them	“more	participative”.	This	possibility,	
however,	is	not	equally	valued	by	everybody:	for	some	it	is	a	second-
best	option	while	others	see	it	as	the	optimum	to	reach.	Among	the	
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latter,	a	former	member	of	the	Asamblea	de	Palermo	Viejo	concludes	
that	 “participation	and	 representation	are	 two	different	 things.	 (…)	
One	does	not	need	to	eliminate	the	other	and	together	they	amount	to	
democracy”	(Female,		years,	with	little	prior	political	experience).
Besides	the	diversity	of	explanations	provided	to	account	for	the	
decline	 –or,	 according	 to	 some,	 the	 failure–	 of	 the	 assembly	move-
ment,	most	 (if	not	all)	our	 interviewees	believe	 that	 the	causes	 that	
originally	fueled	it	still	remain	in	place.	Many	of	them,	however,	no	
longer	 see	 those	 causes	 in	 the	 original	 terms.	 The	 “political	 class”,	
for	example,	continues	indeed	to	be	the	main	target;	nevertheless,	it	
sometimes	receives	some	credit,	or	at	least	a	suspension	of	disbelief,	
since	many	assembly	members	(present	or	past)	have	deposited	mild	
expectations	on	the	new	government,	despite	it	having	been	born	out	
of	one	of	the	two	big	partners	in	the	so-called	“partidocracia”.	Equa-
lly	numerous	are	the	interviewees	who	complain	instead	that	citizens	
(including	many	assembly	members,	and	especially	former	ones)	have	
diligently	returned	to	the	polls	to	re-legitimate	a	system	that	no	doubt	
still	functions	perversely.	The	most	ideology-driven	activists	go	on	to	
state	 that	 the	assembly	movement	 failed	because	 it	was	not	 radical	
enough,	as	it	did	not	thoroughly	reject	“the	republican	and	represen-
tative	 regime,	 so	when	 the	 government	 says	 ‘go	 vote	 again’,	 people	
just	go	and	vote	again.	(…)	The	change	was	not	so	deep,	that	is	why	
[the	establishment]	backed	down	a	 little	 to	 later	 institutionalize	the	
process,	giving	it	an	electoral	solution”	(Male,	47,	Asamblea	Popular	
de	Liniers,	with	long	prior	political	activism).
As	for	the	impact	of	the	assembly	experience,	the	overwhelming	
majority	of	our	present	and	past	assembly	members	initially	declare	
to	notice	“little”	or	“no”	substantial	change	in	Argentina,	in	Buenos	Ai-
res	or	even	in	their	neighborhoods.	Most	interviewees	with	absolutely	
no	previous	political	experience	say	that	the	fact	of	getting	involved	
in	an	experience	with	“participative”	“deliberative”,	“direct”	or	“non-
delegative”	democracy	(according	to	their	different	expressions)	has	
instead	changed	them,	shifting	their	views	and	their	lives	as	a	whole.	
By	contrast,	those	with	a	long	history	of	activism	see	their	assembly	
phase	as	“just	one	more	experience”	–innovative	and	interesting,	no	
doubt,	but	in	no	way	a	“point	of	no	return”	or	a	“loss	of	innocence”.	
Both	groups,	however,	 end	up	agreeing	 that	at	 least	 two	 things	did	
change	in	Argentine	politics	after	all.	Firstly,	they	claim	that	despite	
the	subsequent	process	of	“political	normalization”,	the	experience	of	
insurrection	and	popular	self-organization	remains	in	a	state	of	laten-
cy	to	be	activated	as	soon	as	“the	next	crisis”	strikes.	Secondly,	they	
state	that	although	“nobody	went	away”,	the	threat	embodied	in	the	
presence	of	a	vigilant	citizenry	now	aware	of	the	limits	of	representa-
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tive	democracy	has	set	stricter	limits	to	power	abuse.	That	is	precisely	
what,	according	to	some	of	them,	accounts	for	the	relatively	“progre-
ssive”	 characteristics	 of	 the	 “normalizing”	Kirchner	 administration,	
which	–they	claim–	felt	compelled	to	incorporate,	at	least	through	lip	
service,	many	of	the	reclamations	put	forward	by	mobilized	citizens.
The	 assembly	 experience	 also	 resulted	 in	 the	 reformulation	 of	
many	participants’	 prior	 expectations,	 not	 just	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 uto-
pian	character	of	 certain	hopes	 that	grew	 in	 the	context	of	Decem-
ber,	00,	but	also	where	certain	aspects	of	representative	systems	are	
concerned.	More	precisely,	the	experience	allowed	for	the	evaluation	
of	 representative	 democracy	 under	 a	 new	 light.	 Take,	 for	 example,	
the	specialization	and	professionalization	of	administrative	 functio-
ns	and	the	roles	performed	by	political	parties	within	a	competitive	
democracy.	Each	and	all	of	them	are	now	revalued	in	contrast	to	the	
“inefficiency”	displayed	by	the	assemblies.	Even	politics	as	a	profes-
sionalized	and	remunerated	activity	has	been	revalued	by	some	inter-
viewees	who	disclose	the	fact	that	they	could	only	devote	themselves	
completely	 to	 their	 assemblies	 during	 the	 several	months	 that	 they	
spent	unemployed,	and	for	 the	simple	reason	that	 they	had	enough	
accumulated	resources	so	as	to	be	able	to	survive	without	a	job.	This	
intuition	is	reinforced	through	the	analysis	of	the	effects	of	the	fast	de-
cline	of	citizen	mobilization	and	the	transformation	of	assemblies	into	
redoubts	of	activists	–either	activists	turned	into	assembly	members	
or	assembly	members	 turned	 into	activists.	 It	 is	 at	 this	point	when	
some	of	our	interviewees	get	to	glimpse	an	unexpected	alternative	to	
representative	democracy.	What	if	the	alternative	to	a	democracy	in	
the	hands	of	professional	politicians	who	are,	after	all,	elected	by	the	
citizenry	through	free	and	clean	elections,	happened	to	be	not	a	hea-
venly	direct	democracy	but,	in	a	context	of	low	popular	participation,	
the	constitution	of	a	 self-selected	group	of	 leaders	 formed	by	 those	
who	have	the	time,	resources,	charisma	or	interest	to	devote	full-time	
to	politics?	Professional	politicians	would	no	 longer	score	so	 low	 if	
compared	to	such	an	aristocracy,	free	of	the	constraints	of	any	insti-
tutionalized	 accountability	mechanism.	A	 conclusion	 follows:	 given	
the	available	options,	 the	most	valuable	aspiration	 to	pursue	might	
be,	after	all,	that	of	a	functioning	representative	democracy	in	which	
professional	politicians	and	public	officials	are	kept	on	a	leash	by	an	
informed	citizenry	capable	and	willing	to	exert	on	them	all	their	avai-
lable	powers	of	monitoring	and	control.
Was	such	a	citizenry	produced	or	expanded	by	the	assembly	ex-
perience	or,	more	broadly	speaking,	by	the	participatory	upsurge	of	
00?	It	is	apparent	that	the	assemblies’	experience	was	disappoin-
ting	 in	many	ways,	as	most	of	 their	 former	members	easily	admit	
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it.	Disillusionment	is	not	only	related	to	the	assemblies’	actual,	con-
crete	and	tangible	results	in	terms	of	the	goods	and	services	delive-
red	and	the	policies	enacted	–which	are	usually	considered	negligi-
ble–	but	also	to	the	limited	satisfaction	brought	by	the	participatory	
experience	 itself,	 related	 in	 turn	 to	 the	 stark	 contrast	between	 the	
huge	expectations	it	fostered	and	the	modest	outcomes	it	produced.	
It	 is	 important	 to	 keep	 in	mind	 that	 the	 experience	we	 examined	
involved	mostly	middle-class	citizens,	at	least	as	far	as	their	cultural	
standpoint	was	concerned.	Thus,	the	democratizing	potential	of	the	
experience	turned	out	to	be	not	just	a	welcome	but	quite	unexpected	
by-product	of	practices	undertaken	with	other	purposes	in	mind	but,	
instead,	an	aim	located	at	the	very	core	of	the	actors’	understanding	
of	their	own	actions.	For	good	or	for	bad,	our	political	actors	hap-
pened	to	be	theoretically	 informed	–though	sometimes	also	a	 little	
confused	out	of	too	much	theory	delivered	in	too	simplified	a	pac-
kage.	 Indeed,	debates	on	how	 to	make	 the	experience	more	 “hori-
zontal”	and	“participatory”	–and,	thus,	more	“democratic”–	(and	on	
how	to	spill	those	effects	onto	its	surroundings,	eventually	reaching	
the	whole	society	and	political	institutions	alike)	took	place	“almost	
obsessively”	in	most	assemblies,	as	some	put	it.	It	must	also	be	ac-
knowledged	that	the	assembly	experience	took	place	in	the	context	
of	a	huge,	total	crisis	that	produced	a	very	peculiar	collective	state	
of	mind	that,	by	definition,	could	not	endure	long.	What	was	left	of	
it	when	the	participatory	effervescence	subdued	and	the	deliberative	
frenzy	receded?	A	few	assemblies	certainly	remained,	but	they	sur-
vived	through	adaptation	and	mutation	into	clientelistic	machines,	
not	quite	different	from	the	local	branches	of	traditional	parties.	As	
for	the	assemblies	that	disappeared,	the	question	is:	did	they	leave	
anything	behind?
It	can	be	claimed	that	they	did.	Besides	the	appraisal	by	several	
individuals	of	what	came	to	be	the	“experience	of	a	lifetime”,	having	
turned	 them	 into	 more	 assertive,	 stronger,	 self-confident	 persons,	
what	they	left	behind	were	certain	criteria	of	what	“democratic”	is	
supposed	to	mean	that	–though	eventually	acknowledged	not	to	be	
fully	applicable	to	“normal”	politics	and	regular	political	institutio-
ns–	were	nevertheless	thought	to	be	useful	to	judge	their	performan-
ce.	In	that	sense,	the	result	was	the	production	of	a	more	critical	citi-
zenry,	that	for	a	couple	of	years	kept	the	government	strictly	in	check.	
For	some	time	indeed,	the	rebellious	experience	stayed	fresh	in	the	
minds	of	politicians,	who	were	truly	concerned	and	even	afraid	of	it	
happening	again.	In	January,	00,	the	Secretary-General	of	the	Pre-
sidency	for	the	Duhalde	administration,	Aníbal	Fernández,	publicly	
stated	that	the	government	needed	to	respond	to	popular	demands	
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such	as	those	put	forward	by	the	cacerolazos	because	if	it	failed	to	do	
so	“the	people	will	kick	us	out”	(La Nación,	/0/0).	In	April,	00,	
Néstor	Kirchner	was	elected	in	the	first	electoral	round	with	roughly	
%	of	the	vote,	and	went	on	to	build	his	basis	of	support	through	
the	 constitution	 of	 a	 “virtual	 electorate”	 –that	 is,	 by	 following	 the	
dictates	of	public	opinion.	Some	“progressive”,	even	“politically	co-
rrect”	decisions	were	rapidly	enacted.	Until	mid-term	congressional	
elections	were	held	 in	 005,	 alleged	 attempts	 at	 “political	 reform”	
(a	collection	of	disparate	changes	 in	political	practices	 that,	 if	 en-
acted,	would	supposedly	turn	representative	democracy	into	either	
a	more	 representative,	 a	more	 responsive,	 a	more	 accountable	 or	
a	more	direct	one)	continued	 to	make	headlines.	Halfway	 into	his	
term,	 though,	 President	Kirchner	 succeeded	 in	 turning	 his	 virtual	
electorate	 into	 an	 actual	 one,	 therefore	 completing	 the	 process	 of	
reconstruction	of	presidential	authority	as	well	as	his	own	basis	of	
support.	Normalcy	had	successfully	been	restored,	substitute	goods	
were	being	delivered;	soon	after,	political	reform	eventually	waned	
into	oblivion.
How	critical,	how	active,	how	assertive	and	how	much	to	fear	a	
citizenry	is	then	to	be	found	in	present	Argentina?	In	a	country	that	
seems	to	regard	crises	as	a	privileged	tool	 for	political	change,	 that	
still	remains	to	be	seen.	
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